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Abstract: 
This study investigates education, income and age driven heterogeneity in 
the effect of children in and outside the household on annual saving, the 
importance of saving motives, and the regularity of saving, using the 2005-
2007 waves of the German SAVE dataset. Children are found to have a 
negative effect on the level and the regularity of saving, and they appear to 
intensify the competition among saving motives, shifting the relative 
importance towards saving for home acquisition, debt reduction, children’s 
education/support, bequest, and taking advantage of state subsidies at the 
expense of saving for large purchases, travel, unforeseen events, and old-
age provision. When children leave the household, their influence gets 
usually weaker, but shows more persistence in high education households, 
at least with respect to the level and the regularity of saving. This is 
suggested to be a consequence of intergenerational educational immobility 
and the resulting tendency of highly educated parents to invest more in 
their children’s human capital. Unfortunately, there is less evidence for 
educational differences in the effect of children on saving motives—in 
particular with respect to the motives children’s education/support and 
bequest—that would reinforce this hypothesis. Household income and, to a 
lesser extent, the age of the household head appear to alleviate the effect 
that children have on saving behavior. Instrumenting fertility by exogenous 
variation created by peer group effects does not indicate that the pattern 
outlined above is driven by endogenous fertility.  
When the results are used to adjust life cycle consumption profiles, it is 
concluded that accounting for the number of children significantly reduces 
the ‘hump shape’ in consumption and can thus contribute to the 
explanation of the consumption/income parallel, in particular after the first 
third of the life cycle. 
The following text is based on my diploma thesis, which was completed in 
June 2008. I am very grateful to my supervisor Dr. Michela Coppola and 
Dr. Anette Reil-Held for excellent support and advice. I would also like to 
thank the MEA seminar participants and Professor Börsch-Supan for their 
valuable comments. Michael Ziegelmeyer provided excellent help in proof-
reading this thesis. 
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1 Introduction and Motivation 
Micro data reveals that households differ widely in their saving be-
havior (see, e.g., Browning & Lusardi (1996, pp. 1797, 1848); Ales-
sie et al. (1997, pp. 21-31)). This observable heterogeneity concerns 
not only the decision how much to save, but also the motives out of 
which households save, the fact whether or not they save for a spe-
cific saving goal, the extent to which they save on a regular basis, 
and the kinds of assets they invest in. Thus, the saving decision ap-
pears to be quite complex. It gets even more intricate if it is assumed 
that household saving is not only a means to shift consumption be-
tween periods, but that it could also be stimulated by the social rec-
ognition that might stem from wealth (Corneo and Jeanne (2001a, 
b)) or even by the sheer pleasure of accumulating resources. This 
would imply that savings may create utility not only when they are 
transformed into consumption, but also at the time when they are 
accumulated.  
Overall, the complexity of the saving decision and the resulting het-
erogeneity in household saving behavior is still not very well under-
stood and subject to many open questions (Browning & Lusardi 
(1996, pp. 1849-1850)). One of these questions is how a house-
hold’s fertility affects its saving behavior and how this effect inter-
acts with other household characteristics. This study wants to con-
tribute to the exploration of this issue by investigating heterogeneity 
in the effect of children on household saving behavior. The major 
contribution to the existing literature is considered to be threefold. 
First, to capture the complexity of saving behavior, three dimensions 
are considered and the results set into context. Besides the amount 
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of annual saving, these dimensions comprise the different motives 
out of which households save (saving motives) as well as the regu-
larity with which households set aside money (regularity of saving). 
Second, I distinguish between the effects of children living in their 
parents’ household and of those living outside the household as a 
proxy for the children’s age and needs. Finally, these effects are 
allowed to vary by the parents’ educational level, income, and age—
with a focus on education. 
To shed light on this issue is of considerable interest for several 
reasons. The first constitutes an advancement of economic theory, in 
particular the life cycle hypothesis, whose theoretical predictions 
have been challenged by empirical evidence, as will be outlined in 
more detail in the next section. Understanding the relationship be-
tween fertility and saving behavior and extending the model by in-
corporating important household characteristics—in particular 
household composition, education, and the interaction of the two—
may help to reconcile theoretical predictions and empirical observa-
tions. 
Second, while understanding the effects of changes in household 
characteristics on saving behavior as such is deemed interesting 
from an economist’s point of view, it might also yield helpful impli-
cations for policy makers. By revealing which types of households 
save how much and out of which reasons as well as how different 
household types react to changes in their economic circumstances, 
such understanding can help not only to assess the interaction of 
policy reforms and household private saving (Schunk (2007, p. 2)) 
but also to develop target oriented policy tools to alter the saving 
 
 
3 
behavior of specific household types, e.g., to stimulate or repress 
their saving. The economic desirability of such interventions hinges 
on the assumption that a household’s saving decision is either not 
completely rational and/or incorporates social externalities (Harris et 
al. (2002, p. 207)). For instance, in the presence of a social security 
system, a more even distribution of wealth can lessen the burden on 
social security since private savings instead of welfare payments 
could serve as a buffer against unforeseen events. In this context, 
my analysis may help to identify which household types are limited 
in their ability or willingness to save and for which reasons.  
In addition to the distribution of saving between households, policy 
makers may be concerned about dynamic aspects of saving, espe-
cially with respect to the foreseeable demographic transition and 
aging population in many Western economies. While some effort is 
made to encourage childbearing in order to counteract the demo-
graphic transition (e.g., via the newly introduced ‘Elterngeld’ in 
Germany), a rise in the ratio of retirees to workers appears to be 
inevitable. The resulting financial burden on tomorrow’s diminish-
ing workforce could be alleviated by an increase in private savings 
today that lowers the dependence on public pension schemes tomor-
row. But if households are expected both to raise more children and 
to accumulate more savings to provide for their retirement, it is cru-
cial to understand the relationship between households’ fertility and 
saving behavior. Do households with children neglect saving for 
other purposes, such as their old-age provision? Do children reduce 
the overall level of household saving or the regularity, with which 
households save? An analysis of the effect of children on saving 
motives as well as on the level and the regularity of saving can yield 
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some answers to these questions. In particular, the investigation of 
heterogeneity among households can help to design policies that 
specifically assist those households for which a possible tradeoff 
between raising children and accumulating savings is most severe—
without producing large windfall gains. If, for instance, households 
who give birth to children at an early age face more problems to 
combine raising children and saving than older ones, transfer pay-
ments could be differentiated according to the age of the household 
head. Similarly, young children may deter saving more or less than 
older ones, and a possibility to account for that would be a differen-
tiation of transfer payments according to the children’s age.  
Third, and last, investigating saving behavior at the household level 
provides a basis for analyses of aggregate saving. A major advan-
tage of micro data over aggregate data is the possibility to assess the 
effect of household characteristics and their interactions on saving 
(Attanasio & Weber (1995, p. 1122)). Of special interest is the effect 
of variables whose likely future development can be predicted by 
extrapolating ongoing trends, such as the number of children per 
family (decreasing) and households’ educational level (increasing). 
An empirical evaluation of these effects might help to predict future 
aggregate saving, which is crucial for economic growth.  
To summarize, assessing heterogeneity in the effect of children on 
household saving behavior can be considered as a significant contri-
bution to the literature. In fact, Browning and Crossley (2001, p. 20) 
note that in the context of consumption and saving behavior, “the 
most important issue may be the need to allow for heterogeneity.” 
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Such a detailed micro analysis regarding the effect of children on 
saving behavior has not yet been provided for Germany.  
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. Section 2 out-
lines the significance of fertility for the theory of consumption and 
saving (2.1). On the basis of theoretical considerations (2.2), and 
former empirical evidence (2.3), hypotheses on the effect of children 
on saving behavior are formulated (2.4). Section 3 describes the data 
(3.1), especially the construction of key variables (3.2), as well as 
certain data limitations (3.3), which result in sample restrictions 
(3.4). This section concludes with a description of sample character-
istics (3.5). Section 4 provides a descriptive analysis of fertility be-
havior (4.1), the evolution of key variables over the life cycle (4.2), 
and the relationship between fertility and the three dimensions of 
saving behavior examined (4.3). Section 5 specifies econometric 
models (5.1) and discusses some econometric issues (5.2). Section 6 
presents the estimation results of these models for annual saving 
(6.1), saving motives (6.2), and the regularity of saving (6.3). This 
section also illustrates how instrumenting fertility affects the results 
(6.4), and uses them to adjust life cycle profiles of consumption and 
saving for the number of children (6.5). Finally, section 7 concludes 
and outlines future research perspectives.   
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2 Theory and Discussion of the Existing Literature 
This section further motivates the investigation of the effect of chil-
dren on saving behavior as an important component of the explana-
tion of one of the major challenges to the life cycle hypothesis (2.1). 
After discussing possible effects from a theoretical perspective (2.2), 
former empirical evidence is presented (2.3). On this basis, the sec-
tion concludes with specific hypotheses on the effect of children on 
annual saving, saving motives, and the regularity of saving (2.4).  
2.1 Theoretical Background 
In his General Theory, Keynes (1936, p. 57) assumes that “net in-
come is what we suppose the ordinary man to reckon his available 
income to be when he is deciding how much to spend on current 
consumption.” This has widely been interpreted as suggesting that 
current net income determines current consumption although even 
Keynes (1936, p. 95) admits that “Changes in expectations of the 
relation between the present and the future level of income […] may 
affect considerably a particular individual’s propensity to consume.” 
However, he concludes that “there is, as a rule, too much uncertainty 
for it to exert much influence” (Keynes (1936, p. 95)).  
In contrast to this view, the Life Cycle/Permanent Income Hypothe-
sis (LCPIH), whose general ideas can be attributed mainly to Fisher 
(1930) and Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) for a finite horizon and 
Ramsey (1928) and Friedman (1957) for an infinite horizon, postu-
lates that the decision on current consumption is based on permanent 
income rather than current income, i.e., on the total lifetime re-
Theory and Discussion of the Existing Literature 
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sources available to the agent. The basic version of the model as-
sumes agents with an intertemporally additive, quadratic utility 
function and rational expectations, who face perfect capital markets 
and perfect certainty—alternatively to the latter, they may behave as 
expected utility maximizers (Browning & Lusardi (1996, pp. 1800-
1801)). In this model, optimal behavior involves a constant (dis-
counted) marginal utility of consumption over the life cycle. Assum-
ing that the marginal utility is decreasing in consumption but inde-
pendent of other factors that change over the life cycle, this means 
that agents ‘smooth consumption’ in the sense that consumption 
opportunities out of transitory income shocks are spread equally 
over the whole life cycle. In other words, the shape of the consump-
tion path over an individual’s lifetime is expected to be independent 
of the shape of the expected income path and should only depend on 
the ratio of the discount rate to the interest rate (Deaton (1992, p. 
26), Browning & Lusardi (1996, p. 1800)). If net income exhibits a 
predictable inverted U-shape, also called ‘hump shape’, over the life 
cycle as it is typically observed, an optimal and thus flat or, account-
ing for differences between the interest rate and the discount rate, 
trending consumption profile would imply that agents should bor-
row prior to labor market entry, repay these debts and accumulate 
savings while they are working, and dissave during retirement 
(Browning & Crossley (2001, p. 14)).  
This testable prediction has been challenged by a whole lot of em-
pirical evidence. Thurow (1969, pp. 324-325) was among the first to 
observe that both income and consumption follow very similar 
hump shapes over the life cycle, peaking roughly at the same age. 
Neither in their youth nor during retirement, agents actually dissave. 
Theoretical Background 
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The observation that consumption seems to track current income has 
been supported by a number of studies (e.g., Browning et al. (1985, 
pp. 528-531), Carroll & Summers (1991, pp. 318-327), Attanasio & 
Weber (1995, S. 1127-1128), Attanasio & Browning (1995, p. 
1121), Attanasio et al. (1999, pp. 23-24), Browning & Crossley 
(2001, pp. 11-12), Browning & Ejrnaes (2002, pp. 12-13), Freyland 
(2005b, p. 26)). Carroll & Summers (1991, pp. 315-318) call this 
puzzle the “consumption/income parallel” and interpret it as evi-
dence against long-term consumption smoothing. Other authors 
refer to it as the “‘excess sensitivity’ of consumption growth to ex-
pected income growth” (e.g., Attanasio & Browning (1995, p. 
1118)). 
A number of possible explanations of this finding have been elabo-
rated, most of which seek to reconcile the theory with the empirical 
evidence by relaxing some of the basic and somewhat restrictive 
assumptions.  
The first explanation interprets the correlation between current in-
come and current consumption as a causal relationship, i.e., agents 
are assumed to have a short planning horizon and rather passively 
follow a rule of thumb and consume—or save, respectively—a fixed 
fraction of current income. This interpretation is very close to the 
Keynesian view outlined above, that uncertainty is too large for 
future income expectations to have much influence. Still, as Brown-
ing & Lusardi (1996, p. 1801) in reference to Deaton (1992, pp. 
110-112) note, the LCPIH could be formally correct, if income was 
a non-stationary process. Under this condition, current consumption 
might track current income even if anticipated income changes are 
Theory and Discussion of the Existing Literature 
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uncorrelated with changes in consumption. Indeed, if income was a 
random walk, any income changes would come at surprise and cur-
rent income would be the ‘best guess’ about permanent income. As 
a result, consumption smoothing would predict consumption to 
track current income. However, since most agents face a predictable 
income growth at the beginning of their life cycle, this explanation 
is not satisfying and in fact, though it might save the LCPIH from 
being formally rejected, it would render it rather useless for behav-
ioral predictions.  
The second explanation goes back to Thurow (1969, pp. 325-326), 
who suggests that while agents favor a flat consumption profile, 
liquidity constraints may prevent them from realizing this optimal 
behavior. In other words, the assumption of perfect capital markets 
is unlikely to hold. He estimates optimal consumption of a specific 
age group by the income level at which the average member of this 
group has zero saving, and compares the resulting ‘optimal profile’ 
with the actual life cycle profile of consumption means (pp. 326-
329). The results suggest that especially young agents consume less 
than they would like to, probably because of borrowing constraints. 
However, while this might be a reason why agents do not run into 
debts early in life, it fails to explain the peak in consumption around 
age 45 and significant saving rates in retirement.     
Nagatani (1972) questions Thurow’s method to derive an optimal 
consumption profile and proposes a third explanation. Given that 
future income is uncertain, he assumes that agents behave ‘prudent’ 
in the sense that they treat future income expectations cautiously and 
exhibit a lower propensity to consume from (uncertain) future in-
Theoretical Background 
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come than from (certain) current income, which implicitly builds 
upon the notion of precautionary savings introduced by Leland 
(1968, p. 468-470).1 Under this assumption, the realized income 
profile matters: As agents age, they accumulate more information 
about their actual income profile and revise their consumption plans 
without changing the general behavioral rule (Nagatani (1972, p. 
348)). The revised consumption profile resembles the hump shape in 
the income profile (p. 351). This introduction of a ‘precautionary 
saving motive’ into the LCPIH model has received much attention 
in the literature (see, e.g., Carroll (1997) and the references therein). 
However, as with liquidity constraints, precautionary saving may 
explain the presence of positive saving early in life, but fails to give 
convincing reasons for consumption to track income later in life. 
A forth alternative explanation is suggested by Heckman (1974, p. 
189). Assuming a (predictable) hump-shaped wage rate profile over 
the working life, he argues that if individual labor supply and con-
sumption expenditures are complements (e.g., due to work related 
costs), a positive response of labor supply to the wage rate would 
cause labor supply, income, and consumption to exhibit similar 
hump shapes—even with perfect certainty and without liquidity 
constraints. While this would indeed explain the similar shapes of 
income and consumption over the whole life cycle, it critically 
hinges on the assumption that labor supply and consumption as well 
as labor supply and wages are both Frisch complements (i.e., com-
plements within a period). Especially the first part of the assumption 
is questionable since consumption opportunities (holidays, sports, or 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
1 Leland shows that a utility function incorporates a precautionary saving motive if 
the third derivative with respect to consumption is positive. 
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cultural entertainment) are rather negatively correlated with labor 
supply, and empirical evidence suggests that consumption and labor 
supply are substitutes rather than complements (Browning et al. 
(1985, p. 535)). 
It is worth noting that most explanations discussed so far interpret 
the LCPIH’s optimality condition of equal (discounted) marginal 
utility to predict that agents should prefer a flat or, accounting for 
differences between the interest rate and the discount rate, trending 
consumption path to a hump-shaped one if there is no uncertainty. 
But this may be a misconception if the marginal utility of consump-
tion—at a given level of consumption—is allowed to vary over the 
life cycle. Then, as Browning & Crossley (2001, p. 4) note, keeping 
marginal utility constant “may involve quite variable expenditures.”  
Tobin (1967) was the first to suggest that the marginal utility of 
consumption is likely to be affected by the evolution of household 
characteristics over the life cycle. Hence, the incorporation of 
household characteristics might help to explain the hump shape in 
consumption if their life cycle profiles tend to increase marginal 
utility of consumption early in life and to decrease it in old age. 
Besides the state of health and the labor market status of household 
members, household composition, in particular the number of chil-
dren living in a household, is considered as an important factor that 
might induce such a life cycle pattern of marginal utility. As sug-
gested by Tobin (1967, pp. 249-251), Browning et al. (1985, pp. 
529-531) show that the life cycle profile of children living in a 
household indeed displays a hump shape in U.K. data. Attanasio et 
al. (1999, pp. 23-24) reproduce this finding with U.S. data, and At-
Theoretical Background 
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tanasio & Weber  (1995, p. 1127) find a similar pattern for family 
size. Given that the life cycle profile of children is hump-shaped and 
assuming that children increase the marginal utility of consumption, 
keeping marginal utility constant is argued to result in an optimal 
consumption profile that is hump-shaped as well. 
While it is now widely accepted that household characteristics, in 
particular household size and composition, do matter (Browning & 
Crossley (2001, p. 14)), the question, how much household size can 
contribute to the explanation of the consumption/income parallel, 
has been subject to considerable debate. Gourinchas & Parker 
(2002) as well as Attanasio et al. (1999) come to the conclusion that 
though accounting for family composition can reduce the excess 
sensitivity of consumption to current income, a precautionary mo-
tive is needed to predict an optimal hump-shaped consumption pro-
file that is close to the observed pattern. Other articles that are dis-
cussed in the following suggest that accounting for family size and 
composition can completely remove the excess sensitivity of con-
sumption. 
Attanasio & Browning (1995) find the familiar hump shapes of in-
come and consumption, but when they regress year-cohort means on 
the number of children and adults along with a dummy for children 
and the log of family size and plot the residuals against age, the 
profile of consumption adjusted for household composition is re-
markably flat (pp. 1121-1122). The household scales of consump-
tion implied by this basic regression are quite plausible: A two adult, 
one child household consumes 24% more than a two adult house-
hold, the corresponding number for a two adult, two child household 
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being 58%. They conclude that “controlling in a simple way for 
changes in average family composition over the life cycle eliminates 
completely the life cycle correlation of income and consumption” 
(p. 1122). This conclusion is supported by the finding that the effect 
of income growth on consumption growth vanishes in their regres-
sion of an Euler equation once they control for characteristics such 
as household composition (pp. 1128-1130).  
Similar in spirit, Browning & Ejrnaes (2002) estimate a “child re-
sponse function” that relates consumption expenditures on children 
to the number of children, accounting for economies of scale and the 
children’s age (pp. 14-20). Assuming that fertility is completed at 
the wife’s age of 37, they also estimate completed fertility for each 
household (pp. 21-23). Combining the two components, they adjust 
consumption profiles in low and high education households for 
changes in household composition and find that adjusted consump-
tion does not track income. Indeed, the hump shape is almost com-
pletely removed (p. 23-25). Thus, they conclude that taking “proper 
account of the numbers and age of children, family composition can 
‘explain’ completely the hump-shape in consumption” (p. 26). 
Finally, Attanasio & Weber (1995) show that besides not properly 
accounting for household composition, earlier rejections of the 
LCPIH concerning the overidentifying restrictions of the model 
were caused by the use of aggregate time-series data (pp. 1135-
1137) and non-separability between food, which is often taken as a 
proxy for non-durable consumption, and other non-durables (pp. 
1141-1143).   
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While it is not an issue of this study, whether or not household com-
position completely explains the observed patterns of consumption 
and saving, the discussion suggests that children are an important 
factor in explaining consumption and saving behavior. This is taken 
as motivation to shed more light on the effect of children on differ-
ent aspects of saving behavior and how it varies with parents’ edu-
cational level, income, and age as well as the children’s household 
affiliation (i.e., whether or not they live in their parents’ household).  
2.2 Theoretical Analysis of the Effect of Children on Saving 
Behavior 
Incorporating all the various channels on which children and other 
household characteristics may affect saving into a (testable) life 
cycle model is a very challenging task. Since both determinants of 
saving—consumption and income—are affected by household deci-
sions, either directly (consumption) or via labor supply (income), 
one would have to model how decisions of both kinds depend on the 
evolution of household characteristics over the life cycle—
accounting for the fact that some characteristics like children might 
be endogenous to saving behavior2. To the know-ledge of the au-
thor, this has not yet been mastered thoroughly and is well beyond 
the scope of this study. Still, to give some taste for the complexity of 
the matter, this subsection proceeds as follows. First, a rather simple 
life cycle model of income and consumption—and hence saving—is 
outlined that does not model the impact of children explicitly. Then, 
the various channels on which children may have an impact on sav-
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
2 The problem of endogenous fertility behavior will be addressed in more detail in 
sections 5.2.2 and 6.4. 
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ing behavior are discussed on the basis of intuitive arguments and 
some hints are given, which components of the formal optimization 
problem could be affected. I am well aware that this kind of theo-
retical analysis is somewhat limited and unsatisfying, but providing 
at least some theoretical discussion and reference points to a formal 
model is nevertheless considered to yield valuable insights.  
A Formal Model of Life Cycle Saving Without Children 
Assume that a household with rational expectations maximizes an 
intertemporally additive and separable utility function and faces 
perfect capital markets as well as perfect certainty. Let the house-
hold’s maximization problem at a period t = 0 be given by3 
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where CStC denotes consumption of goods that are ‘substitutes for 
children’ (e.g., expensive vacations, restaurant meals, cultural enter-
tainment, and tobacco), CCtC  consumption of goods that are ‘com-
plements to children’ (e.g., housing and related durables like furni-
ture or home appliances, children’s education4, clothing and food), 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
3 This model follows loosely those of Börsch-Supan et al. (2006, pp. 633-634) and 
MaCurdy (1981, pp. 1060-1061). 
4 Strictly speaking, expenditures on children’s education are investments in human 
capital and could be regarded as saving. However, when data is collected, saving is 
usually defined as monetary saving, and therefore, educational expenditures are 
surveyed as part of consumption. 
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LtM (LtF) is male (female) labor supply, L* the period time budget 
(thus L* – LtM  (L* – LtF) is male (female) leisure), A0 initial wealth, 
wtM (wtF) the male (female) wage rate, and Yt non-labor income such 
as transfers; ρ  is the discount rate and r the interest rate. In addi-
tion, assume strictly positive first derivatives of U with respect to all 
four arguments, and strictly negative second derivatives. Apart from 
the budget constraint, an inner solution of this problem is character-
ized by the following set of first order conditions: 
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where subscripts to U denote first derivatives and λ is the shadow 
prize of the present value of lifetime wealth. The corresponding 
Euler equations for two subsequent periods t and t+1 are 
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If, for the sake of exposition, we impose r = ρ and both LtM and LtF 
to be exogenously assigned to a household, the Euler equations im-
ply a constant marginal utility of both kinds of consumption over the 
life cycle (and thus constant total consumption), which is the predic-
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tion of the basic version of the LCPIH (r > ρ  (r < ρ ) would imple-
ment some upward (downward) trend in consumption).  
If LtM and LtF are endogenously determined, the model can also illus-
trate explanation four of the consumption/income parallel (Heckman 
(1974)). Assuming that labor supply and wages are Frisch comple-
ments, an increase (decrease) in the wage rate causes an increase 
(decrease) in labor supply [or a decrease (increase) in leisure] to 
satisfy equation (5). If in addition, consumption and labor supply are 
Frisch complements as well, consumption needs to increase (de-
crease) for equation (4) to hold (as already mentioned, this assump-
tion is very questionable, in this setting particularly with respect to 
the consumption of children-complements). 
Potential Impacts of Children on Saving Behavior 
Now, let us turn to the channels on which children may have an 
impact on saving behavior. In reference to the common definition of 
saving as net income minus consumption, one can distinguish two 
main channels: Those that affect saving via consumption expendi-
tures ( CCt
CS
t CC + ), henceforth referred to as direct cost effects, and 
those that affect saving via labor earnings (wtMLtM + wtFLtF) and non-
labor earnings (Yt), referred to as opportunity cost effects.  
Let us first consider direct cost effects. Obviously, the children’s 
needs have to be satisfied, which should ceteris paribus (c. p.) in-
crease consumption expenditures (Kelley (1973, p. 408), Smith & 
Ward (1980, p. 244), Browning & Ejrnaes (2002, p. 5)). This is es-
sentially the channel that the literature on the ‘household character-
istics explanation’ of the consumption/income parallel mainly refers 
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to when suggesting that children increase the marginal utility of 
consumption (e.g., Attanasio & Browning (1995)). In the model 
above, this could be incorporated by allowing the marginal utility of 
children-complements, CC
tC
U , to depend positively on children. 
However, this does not necessarily imply that children increase total 
consumption since it is likely that children cause substitution effects 
on the consumption of other family members (Henderson (1949-50, 
p. 129), Eizenga (1961, p. 74), Kelley (1973, p. 408), Smith & Ward 
(1980, pp. 244-245), Browning & Ejrnaes (2002, p. 19)). In terms of 
the model, this would mean that the marginal utility of children-
substitutes, CS
tC
U , could depend negatively on children.  
Thus, the net effect of children on total consumption expenditures is 
unclear. Abstracting from the model above, it is likely to depend on 
various other household characteristics that affect the children’s 
needs on the one side and the household’s ability and willingness to 
adjust its consumption portfolio on the other side. Among the for-
mer, the children’s age is likely to be an important factor as it is 
commonly found that expenditures on children rise in their age 
(Espenshade (1974, p. 375), Attanasio & Browning (1995, p. 
1120)). Among the latter, both income and the parent’s age play an 
important role in determining the household’s consumption portfolio 
before the arrival of children. The consumption portfolio is impor-
tant since if it consists to a considerable fraction of substitutes for 
children, the ability to adjust household consumption is greater than 
if a household mainly spends its money on goods necessary for sur-
vival and complements to children (like housing and durables). The 
fraction of children-substitutes is expected to increase in household 
income (Kelley (1973, pp. 408-409)) and the parents’ age, since 
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older parents are likely to have already acquired most durables that 
are necessary to set up a household and their consumption portfolio 
should thus have made the transition from being dominated by chil-
dren-complements to being dominated by children-substitutes 
(Smith & Ward (1980, p. 245)).  
In addition to income and age, cost effects of children may also de-
pend on the parents’ educational level. In particular, one can argue 
that parents with a high educational level spend more on their chil-
dren. The main argument is that there is convincing evidence for 
educational immobility, i.e., children of parents with a higher educa-
tional level tend to achieve higher educational levels as well (see, 
e.g., Becker & Tomes (1986), Black et al. (2005a), and the refer-
ences therein). This can be due to either pure selection or causation 
(Black et al. (2005a, pp. 437-439)). Pure selection means that educa-
tional immobility is a result of partial inheritance of genetic endow-
ment, i.e., highly educated parents tend to have a higher innate abil-
ity which is passed on to their children, and this higher innate ability 
is the reason for the children’s higher educational level. Causation 
means that instead of innate ability, parental education has a causal 
effect on the children’s education. Such a causal effect may arise if 
either parental education increases the children’s ‘cultural endow-
ment’ or if higher education causes parents to have a stronger taste 
for the education of their offspring. If either genetic or cultural en-
dowment is partially inherited and increases the children’s return on 
education, it is actually rational to anticipate resulting differences in 
the return on education and parents with a higher educational level 
should invest more in their children’s human capital than those with 
a lower educational level (Becker & Tomes (1986, pp. S5-S8)). The 
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latter may find it optimal to invest more in physical bequest instead. 
In any case, this suggests that children of highly educated parents 
are more likely to achieve a high educational level, and therefore, 
highly educated parents are likely to spend more on the education of 
their children but to save less for physical bequests.  
Now, let us turn to opportunity cost effects via labor supply and 
earnings. On the one hand, it is likely that children increase the 
value of time spent at home and thus the opportunity cost of time 
spend at the labor market (Smith & Ward (1980, p. 244)). This may 
particularly apply to women, though this ‘traditional’ pattern is sub-
ject to change. This channel could be incorporated in the model by a 
positive effect of children on the marginal utility of leisure and 
would hint towards a negative effect of children on labor supply. On 
the other hand, if children increase consumption needs, the marginal 
utility of an extra euro of earnings and thus of time spent at the labor 
market might increase as well. This would hint towards a positive 
effect of children on labor supply. Which effect prevails for which 
household member is thus an empirical question. According to An-
grist & Evans (1998, p. 450), numerous studies find fertility (or 
family size) and female labor supply to be negatively correlated. 
Instrumenting fertility with sibling sex composition and twinning, 
they show that while OLS estimates seem to be upward biased, also 
exogenous increases in the number of children significantly reduce 
female labor supply (p. 463). This effect is found to be particularly 
strong for women with a low educational level (p. 467). In contrast 
to that, male labor supply responds very little to changes in the num-
ber of children present in the household (p. 464), and the effect 
might be even positive. 
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Besides labor supply, children may affect another component of 
labor earnings, the wage rate, especially for women (wtF in the 
model above). Theoretically, an observed wage penalty for women 
with children—referred to as the ‘family gap in pay’—might be due 
to either self selection into motherhood and employment (e.g., 
mothers prefer family friendly, but lower pay employment) or to 
causation, which may exist if children reduce the mother’s accumu-
lation of human capital via less education and/or working experi-
ence (Viitanen (2004, p. 3). Viitanen (2004, pp. 13-15)) investigates 
the effects of children on female wages in the U.K. and finds a raw 
wage differential of 40.5% between wages of women with and 
without children, that reduces to around 20% in an OLS regression 
and 10-13% (still significant) if one simultaneously corrects for 
endogeneity of labor force participation and fertility. Davies & Pi-
erre (2005, pp. 477-478) estimate the gap for eleven European coun-
tries and find it to be in a similar range for Germany, around 12%.  
While this hints to a negative effect of children on family income, 
children may also affect household income positively via transfer 
payments to families (Yt in the model above), such as ‘Kindergeld’ 
and the newly introduced ‘Elterngeld’ in Germany, or bonuses to 
unemployment benefits. 
In addition to these two main channels, there are other potential 
channels, which to model would require imposing far more structure 
on the utility function itself. Therefore, the remainder of the discus-
sion provides only intuitive arguments. 
A third channel might operate through an effect of children on 
households’ motives and overall motivation to save. Theoreti-
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cally, one can think of a host of such effects. Children might in-
crease a household’s risk aversion and prudence and thus the impor-
tance of a precautionary motive. Especially young children might 
increase the demand for housing and strengthen the home acquisi-
tion motive, while they are likely to weaken the motive to save for 
expensive travels. As children get older, saving for their education 
may gain in importance, and even later in life, saving for the chil-
dren’s bequest might encourage household saving—whether out of 
altruistic reasons or as a part of an intergenerational convention (see, 
e.g., Villanueva (2005, pp. 512-515) for different models that incor-
porate a bequest motive). Also, children and old-age provision sav-
ing could be treated as substitutes, and thus children potentially re-
duce the importance of the old-age provision motive, although using 
“children as a vehicle for shifting consumption from one period to 
another” (Cigno & Rosati (1996, p. 1568)) seems to be more likely 
in less developed countries (also see Hammer (1986, pp. 107, 111) 
and Schultz (2007, p. 40)). We can conclude that children can 
change the overall motivation and willingness to save as well as the 
importance of different saving goals, which in turn may have an 
effect on the level of saving as well.  
Finally, observed saving behavior does not only depend on what the 
household plans to do, but also whether it adheres to its plans. Ac-
cording to behavioral concepts, even households that are able and 
willing to save might fail to do so if they lack the required will-
power and self control (Thaler & Shefrin (1981), Laibson (1997)). 
For instance, people might succumb to the temptation of high tem-
porary consumption in the face of a positive transitory income 
shock. In this context, it is conceivable that children have an influ-
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ence on a household’s ability to exercise self control, which would 
be a forth channel on our list. Such a channel could be observable if 
households with children c. p. save more or less regularly than 
households without children assuming that households who save 
regularly exercise more self control.5 Whether children alleviate or 
aggravate self-control problems may depend on household charac-
teristics, in particular the level of education. For instance, by achiev-
ing a higher educational level, people may have learned to react to 
challenges that require them to withstand temptations, such as the 
self commitment to learn for exams, by exercising more self control. 
Such experience may help them to exercise more self control and to 
withstand consumption temptations in response to the challenge of 
bringing up children. 
To summarize, children potentially affect household saving behavior 
on several channels, and the impact of these channels is likely to 
depend on various household characteristics, like the educational 
level, income, and age.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
5 I admit that this is disputable. For instance, the commitment to regular saving 
plans could also be a sign for a lack of self control, which households attempt to 
overcome by the commitment. Households that do not have a problem with self 
control might have no gain from such a commitment. From this perspective, house-
holds that do not save at all might have more severe problems with self control than 
households that regularly save a fixed amount, while in turn such a commitment 
might be a sign for less self control than reflected by saving regularly a flexible 
amount.  
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2.3 Empirical Evidence on the Effect of Children on Saving 
Behavior in the Literature 
Given that there are a number of different, but often interrelated 
theoretical channels on which children may affect saving behavior 
and that one can find arguments for a particular channel to work in 
one direction or the other, what does former empirical evidence 
suggest about the effect of children on the saving dimensions inves-
tigated in this study, i.e., annual saving, saving motives, and the 
regularity of saving?  
Saving Motives 
Harris et al. (2002, pp. 208-210) provide an interesting descriptive 
analysis of the importance of saving motives for different age 
groups and households with and without children. They report that 
saving for durables and travel becomes less important over the life 
cycle, while saving for old-age provision and unforeseen events 
becomes more important. The presence of children is primarily as-
sociated with a gain in importance of saving for their education. 
DeVaney & Chien (2002, pp. 67-68) estimate the odds of children’s 
education being the most important saving motive and find the 
number of children age 18 and below, a good state of health and full 
time work of the household head as well as a working spouse among 
the most important factors with a positive effect. Furthermore, Xiao 
& Noring (1994, pp. 34-35) conclude that children’s education is 
more important for household heads that are male, married, highly 
educated, and younger than 45. In addition to a positive correlation 
between the number of children and the importance of saving for 
their education, Yilmazer (2002, pp. 77-79, 95) finds the number of 
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children to be positively related to saving for retirement, but nega-
tively to saving for unforeseen events. DeVaney et al. (2007) choose 
a different approach and rank saving motives from physiological or 
basic needs over safety and security needs, societal needs, and lux-
ury needs to self actualization. They conclude that having more fam-
ily members makes it more likely to move up this hierarchy up to 
societal needs, but less likely to move from societal to higher needs 
(p. 184). 
Annual Saving and the Regularity of Saving 
The empirical evidence on the effect of children on saving is not 
clear-cut. There are relatively few studies that are explicitly dedi-
cated to the estimation of this effect, and their results are sometimes 
hard to compare since they are for different countries and use differ-
ent saving measures and specifications for the explanatory variables. 
Table 1 gives an overview.  
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Table 1: Overview: Effects of Children on Saving in the Literature 
Reference   Dependent  
Variable 
Country Effect of Children 
Espenshade (1974) consumption 
expenditures 
U.S. 1st child costs about twice as much 
as 2nd and 3rd child. 
Costs increase in children's age. 
Costs increase in income, but 
proportional costs decline. 
Kelley (1972) saving rate U.S. Effect on saving is non-existent for 
the 1st child, positive for the 2nd 
child, and negative thereafter. 
Espenshade (1975) saving level U.S. Children’s age matters, not their 
number: Having young children 
reduces saving whereas having 
older children increases saving. 
Smith & Ward (1980) saving level U.S. Small children depress saving in 
young families but increase saving 
for couples married longer than 5 
years. Older children have no 
significant influence on saving. 
Yilmazer (2002) saving level  U.S. An additional child reduces saving 
for young household heads, but 
increases saving for old household 
heads. 
Harris et al. (2002) saving  
(ordinal) 
Australia Presence and no. of children reduce 
the prob. of saving. 
Murata (2003) assets/ 
perm. income
Japan Children lower the asset to perma-
nent income ratio. 
Orbeta (2006) saving level  
and rates 
Philippines Negative effect of children on 
saving levels and rates. 
Freyland (2005b) saving rate Germany Positive effect of children on sav-
ing rates in young households and 
for younger children, but negative 
effect in older households and for 
older children. 
Schunk (2007) saving rate Germany Insignificant effect of children. 
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Kelley (1972) estimates the effect of children on saving rates using 
an 1889 sample of 1,956 U.S. households employed in heavy indus-
tries. He allows each child in the birth order to affect saving rates 
differently and distinguishes between a direct effect (holding income 
constant) and an indirect effect (via income adjustments). Though 
not linear, the former is always found to be negative, the latter to be 
positive. The net effect is non-existent for the first child, positive for 
the second child and negative thereafter. According to Espenshade 
(1975, p. 124), these predictions are very sensitive to the treatment 
of insignificant coefficients. Using the 1960-1961 young family 
sample of the U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES), he con-
cludes that not the number but the age of children affects annual net 
saving: Having young children reduces saving whereas having older 
children stimulates saving (pp. 124-125). He explains this finding 
with the anticipation of college expenditures. However, in my opin-
ion, his specification of children’s age—6 dummies for different age 
patterns—is somewhat crude and might very well confound the ef-
fects of children’s age and number. In an earlier paper, he defines 
the cost of a child as the “difference in after tax money incomes 
required by n child and n-1 child families to maintain the same stan-
dard of living” (Espenshade (1974, p. 360)), using the proportion of 
after tax income spend on food as an index for the standard of liv-
ing. His most important findings are the following: First, the first 
child costs about twice as much as the second and third child, which 
are roughly equally expensive; second, costs increase in the child’s 
age; and third, while expenditures on children increase in income, 
the proportional costs (i.e., as a fraction of household income) de-
cline (p. 375). 
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Smith & Ward (1980) provide a thorough investigation of the first 
two channels outlined in section 2.2 using a subsample of couples of 
the U.S. Panel Study of Consumer Durables and Installment Debt 
1968-1970. They use the same set of variables to assess the effect of 
children under 18 on financial assets, durable assets, wife annual 
hours and income, and consumption with simple linear models. 
Their main finding is that small children depress saving—measured 
as the change in financial assets—in young families but increase 
saving for couples married longer than 5 years (pp. 252-253). This 
net effect is a result of the following impacts: Small children reduce 
both family consumption and income; the latter effect is due to a 
decline in the wife’s labor supply, while the husband’s labor supply 
rises. For young families, consumption declines less than income 
since their consumption portfolio consists to a large fraction of dur-
ables, i.e., children-complements, while the sign is reversed for 
older families, whose consumption portfolio has shifted towards 
children-substitues. Older children have no significant influence on 
the level of saving but change the composition of assets towards 
durables. Thus, they find some evidence for heterogeneity in the 
children effect over marriage duration and children’s age. 
More recent studies that are at least partly dedicated to the effect of 
children on saving(s) are those of Yilmazer (2002) for the U.S., 
Harris et al. (2002) for Australia, Murata (2003) for Japan, Orbeta 
(2006) for the Philippines, and Freyland (2005a, b) and Schunk 
(2007) for Germany. 
Yilmazer (2002) examines the effects of children on portfolio 
shares, the interrelation between having children, income uncer-
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tainty, and saving, and the effect of financing college education on 
saving6. With respect to portfolio choice, the number of children is 
found to have a significant positive effect both on the probability of 
owning a home as well as on the portfolio share of housing. This 
goes at the expense of other assets, especially retirement accounts 
(pp. 11-12). While higher income uncertainty does not affect saving 
systematically, it is negatively correlated with the probability of 
having children (p. 59-61). An additional child reduces saving for 
young household heads, but increases saving for old household 
heads (p. 62). This is partly explained by saving for college educa-
tion, which rises in the age of the household head (pp. 4-5, 93). 
Harris et al. (2002, p. 217) operate with a children dummy and the 
number of children in the same regression and find that “the pres-
ence of children has a detrimental effect on the probability of sav-
ing, and the more children in a household, the more difficulty a 
household has saving anything.” Similar to that, Orbeta (2006, p. 2) 
reports a negative effect of children on both saving levels and rates, 
which is regressive in income, and Murata (2003, p. 33) finds that 
children lower the asset to permanent income ratio. 
For Germany, the empirical evidence is quite scarce. Using the 
German Socioeconomic Panel 1992-2001, Freyland (2005b) ana-
lyzes the effect of household composition—the presence and age of 
children, the intra household distribution of income, and the parents’ 
age sex composition—on household saving. In contrast to Espen-
shade (1975), Smith & Ward (1980), and Yilmazer (2002), he ob-
tains positive effects of children on saving rates in young house-
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
6 This is less of an issue in Germany because of very moderate or even zero tuition 
fees. 
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holds and for young children, but negative effects in older house-
holds and for older children (pp. 42-43, 46). The coefficient of a 
dummy for children outside the household is negative but its signifi-
cance depends on the specification used. The coefficients of all other 
variables describing household composition are insignificant and 
some of them have a different sign than expected (pp. 45-46).  
From this analysis, my study takes up the part on the effect of chil-
dren on saving and expands it mainly in three dimensions. First, it 
accounts for the number of children instead of only a dummy; sec-
ond, it allows for heterogeneity in the effect of children over educa-
tional levels, income, and age; and third, it considers several aspects 
of saving behavior. In the latter respect, my analysis is closest to 
Schunk (2007), who uses the 2003 random sample of the German 
SAVE survey to examine the effects of saving motives and various 
household characteristics, including the number of children, on sav-
ing rates and the tendency to save on a regular basis. He finds that 
for young household heads, solely the old-age provision and the 
home acquisition motive are positively correlated with the saving 
rate, while for old household heads, this is the case for the precau-
tionary and the bequest motive (pp. 15-16). With respect to the regu-
larity of saving, his results suggest that households for which the 
old-age provision motive is important save more regularly, while the 
opposite is the case for households who consider the precautionary 
motive as important (pp. 19-20). Unfortunately, the coefficients of 
most household characteristics, including the number of children, 
are insignificant, which is probably due to the small sample size. 
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While this study looks at very similar dimensions of saving behav-
ior, the main difference to Schunk (2007) is that I do not try to ex-
plain one dimension by another, but I take the same set of household 
characteristics to explain each dimension separately. This is done for 
two main reasons. First, the direction of causality between the three 
dimensions is unclear and they are likely to be jointly determined.7 
Second, including the other dimensions of saving behavior in the 
explanation of annual saving takes away the indirect effect that chil-
dren have on saving via changing the importance of saving motives 
or the regularity of saving. 
2.4 Hypotheses on the Effect of Children on Saving Behavior 
Section 2.2 concluded that children may affect saving behavior on a 
number of theoretical channels, whose respective direction is likely 
to depend on household characteristics. Also, the empirical results 
on the net effect of children in section 2.3 vary quite a bit in sign 
between countries, samples, and specifications. This further hints to 
the fact that taking proper account of heterogeneity in household 
characteristics and resulting variation in the effect of children is of 
utmost importance. Based on both the theoretical considerations and 
the former empirical evidence, one can set up hypotheses on the net 
effect of children in and outside the household on annual saving, the 
importance of saving motives, and the regularity of saving, and how 
these effects interact with the parent’s educational level, income, 
and age.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
7 In fact, the most thorough analysis should estimate the equations for all three 
dimensions jointly, allowing for possible feedback between them. However, to the 
knowledge of the author, such an analysis has not yet been provided and is clearly 
beyond the scope of this thesis.  
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On average, the net effect of children on annual saving can be ex-
pected to be negative since former empirical evidence suggests that 
the cost effect of children is predominant. With respect to the regu-
larity of saving, the direction of the impact of children is difficult to 
predict. The cost effect of children, especially unanticipated costs, 
suggests that children deter households from saving regularly. But if 
children encourage a household to exercise more self control, the 
opposite could be the case. With respect to saving motives, I would 
expect children to increase the importance of saving for children-
complements—such as the acquisition of a home, the education and 
support of children, and bequests—and to decrease the importance 
of saving for children-substitutes, such as expensive travels and old-
age provision. The effect of children on saving for large purchases is 
ambiguous, since large purchases could refer to children-
complements (e.g., furniture, expensive housing appliances) as well 
as to children-substitutes (e.g., expensive sport equipment, fancy 
cars). Since children probably increase the risk of unanticipated 
expenditure shocks, we might also expect a positive effect of chil-
dren on the importance of saving for unforeseen events and the re-
duction of debts. Finally, children are likely to increase the impor-
tance of saving as a means to take advantage of state subsidies since 
state subsidies are often more generous for households with chil-
dren. 
These effects of children on saving behavior are expected to be re-
gressive in income and age, since both higher income and higher age 
contribute to the transformation from a children-complement to a 
children-substitute consumption portfolio and thus make it easier to 
adjust the consumption of other family members in response to chil-
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dren. In other words, as children impose less (relative) burden on the 
household, their influence on saving behavior should decline. 
It is more difficult to speculate on the influence of the educational 
level on the effect of children. On the one hand, if better educated 
parents are able to exercise more self control in the face of chal-
lenges that require them to withstand temptations, it might be easier 
for them to reduce their own consumption in response to the chil-
dren’s needs. In other words, education may amplify positive effects 
of children on self control (henceforth referred to as education in-
duced self control effects (of children on saving behavior)). On the 
other hand, if the educational immobility story is true and higher 
educated parents invest more in their children’s human capital, a 
higher level of education may increase the costs of children, some of 
which might be unanticipated (education induced cost effects (of 
children on saving behavior)). Thus, the direction of the interaction 
effect of children and a high parental education depends on which of 
the following effects prevails: Education induced self control effects 
may alleviate the negative effects of children on the level and the 
regularity of saving, whereas education induced cost effects may 
aggravate these negative effects, especially when some of these 
costs are unanticipated.  
Moreover, if the reason for educational immobility is that highly 
educated parents have a stronger preference for their children’s edu-
cation rather than for physical bequests, one would also expect the 
interaction of children and a high parental education to have a posi-
tive effect on the motive to save for the education and support of 
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children, but a negative effect on the motive to save for leaving a 
bequest.  
Finally, when children leave the household and start making their 
own living, their effect on all three dimensions of the parents’ sav-
ing behavior is likely to decline. In this context, the educational 
immobility argument suggests that because of longer periods of 
education, children of highly educated parents depend longer on 
their parents, which might cause their effect on saving behavior to 
be more persistent when they leave the household.  
Before we can turn to an empirical investigation of the matter, sec-
tion 3 provides a description of the data that is used for the descrip-
tive and regression based analysis.   
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3 Description of the Data, Data Limitations, and 
 Sample Restrictions 
This section describes the design of the German SAVE survey (3.1), 
the construction of key variables (3.2), data limitations (3.3) that 
lead to sample restrictions (3.4), the construction of weights and 
resulting sample characteristics (3.5). 
3.1 The German SAVE Survey 
To obtain a more thorough understanding of the many facets of 
household saving behavior and to assist policy makers in reforming 
the social security system in the face of demographic transition, the 
German SAVE survey has started in 2001 to collect not only de-
tailed information on household financial variables such as income, 
saving, and asset holdings, but also a wide range of demographic, 
sociological, and psychological characteristics. Among the latter are 
questions regarding the state of health, social environment, expecta-
tions, planning horizon, risk attitude, and further information on 
character traits of the respondent that are potentially important for 
explaining saving behavior. This richness and depth of household 
information makes the SAVE data set unique for analyzing saving 
behavior in Germany. The survey has been repeated in 2003 and 
conducted on an annual basis since 2005. Since first, the design of 
the questionnaire and the method of collecting the data have evolved 
quite a bit in the first years, and second, both interviewers and re-
spondents have learned significantly how to deal with the questions 
such that the data quality has increased over the years, only waves 
2005 to 2007 are used in the analysis. Since most questions, espe-
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cially on the financial situation of the household, refer to the preced-
ing year, the observation period corresponds to 2004 to 2006. As 
figure 1 illustrates, a significant fraction of households is inter-
viewed repeatedly, resulting in a panel structure for most of the sam-
ple. 
Figure 1: SAVE Sample Design 
 
 
Source: Börsch-Supan et al. (2008, p. 36). 
Note that the sampling techniques differ between the two sub sam-
ples. While the Random Sample is obtained by a multiple stratified 
multistage random route procedure, the Access Panel is based on a 
quota sample where the quotas are in proportion to the 2000 Mik-
rozensus collected by the Statistisches Bundesamt and relate to age, 
whether the household head is a wage earner or salaried employee, 
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and household size (Börsch-Supan et al. (2008, pp. 35-38), also refer 
to this source for more information on the methodology used in 
SAVE). It appears that on average, members of the Access Panel are 
slightly better educated, and also do a bit better with respect to net 
income, annual saving, and wealth. But since both sub samples yield 
similar results, it seems justifiable to combine them for the sake of 
efficiency, as also done by Börsch-Supan et al. (2007, p. 5). 
3.2 Description of Key Variables 
Before we can analyze the relationship between different variables 
in the dataset and interpret the results correctly, we need to have a 
precise notion of the respective variables, i.e., what exactly they 
measure and how this measurement is conducted. Therefore, this 
subsection describes the construction of key variables such as an-
nual saving, the importance of saving motives, the regularity of sav-
ing, and the educational level. 
The definition of annual saving is not straightforward. Most com-
monly, saving is defined either as net income minus consumption 
(Yt – Ct) or as the change in household assets (At – At-1) (Browning 
& Lusardi (1996, pp. 1812-1814), Börsch-Supan et al. (2003, pp. 
65-66)). The main difference between these two definitions is that 
changes in asset real prices are commonly not considered as income 
but change the value of household asset holdings. Further issues are 
whether contributions to the public pension system are regarded as 
taxes (and thus reduce net income) or as saving and whether certain 
expenditures with investment character—such as education expendi-
tures that can be regarded as investments in the stock of human capi-
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tal—are considered as saving or consumption. According to Brown-
ing & Lusardi (1996, p. 1814), there is not a single ‘correct’ defini-
tion of saving. As a result, different studies use different saving 
measures and the usefulness of the definition applied depends on the 
purpose of the analysis. 
The purpose of this study is to assess how households adjust saving 
in response to the number of children, and thus, a ‘useful’ saving 
measure should be under the control of the household to reflect 
planned saving behavior. This is also referred to as “discretionary 
saving” (Börsch-Supan et al. (2003, p. 66)). In SAVE, respondents 
are asked for the total amount of money they and their partner have 
saved during the preceding year. The variable is left-censored at 
zero since respondents can indicate either a positive Euro amount or 
that they have saved nothing or liquidated savings, both which is 
encoded as zero saving. Using such a direct question as an annual 
saving measure involves a number of advantages and disadvantages. 
The left-censoring of the variable precludes the observation of dis-
saving, but to a certain extent that can be dealt with in the regression 
based analysis using a Tobit model. More severe is that the formula-
tion of the question does not state precisely whether the household 
should indicate annual saving net of loan uptake and repayments or 
gross annual saving. Thus, one might be concerned that a household 
who takes on a loan and deposits the money into an account over-
states its saving—though I do not think that this applies to many 
households—or that households do not report loan repayments as 
saving. Therefore, some studies (e.g., Börsch-Supan et al. (2008, p. 
63)) adjust the reported measure by adding loan repayments and 
deducting loan uptake unrelated to home acquisition. I do not follow 
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this procedure for a number of reasons. First, households might al-
ready have indicated net saving such that such a procedure would do 
more harm than good. Second, since households cannot report the 
liquidation of savings, loan-financed consumption would be treated 
as dissaving, whereas savings-financed consumption would not. As 
a result, the adjustment procedure would not yield a reliable meas-
ure of net saving even if every household would report gross saving. 
Finally, the more variables are used to construct the dependent vari-
able, the higher is the fraction of households who do not report at 
least one of the components (28.1% for the adjusted measure, but 
only 9.3% for annual saving). Since the imputation procedure ap-
plied to non-negative variables such as loan uptake and repayments 
is suspected to bias the imputed values upwards as will be discussed 
in the next subsection, the use of a measure constructed from a cou-
ple of these variables would either yield a severely biased measure 
(if imputed values are included) or a small and probably selective 
sample (if imputed values are excluded). A similar problem would 
occur if the change in wealth would be used as a saving measure, 
since wealth consists of a large number of variables with high miss-
ing rates. According to Lusardi et al. (2001, p. 766), high missing 
rates “raise concerns about the accuracy of the reports” and hint to 
severe measurement error, which can be amplified by imputation. 
Differencing such a noisy wealth series could lead to a very high but 
spurious variation in the saving level (Browning & Lusardi (1996, p. 
1814)).  
If all these issues are taken into account, using the direct question 
for annual saving without adjustment for loan uptake and repay-
ments may be the best choice available. Indeed, since this is what 
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households report as their annual saving, it is probably the amount 
they have in mind when facing saving decisions. Thus, as Schunk 
(2007, p. 7) reasons, such a measure for ‘active’ saving can be con-
sidered suitable to assess ‘active’ saving decisions, which is the goal 
of this study. 
Following the question on annual saving, the respondent is asked to 
rank the importance of each of nine saving motives on a scale 
from 0 (totally unimportant) to 10 (very important) with one point 
increments. These nine motives refer to the acquisition of a home 
(henceforth the home acquisition motive), provision for unforeseen 
events (precautionary motive), reduction of debts (debt reduction 
motive), old-age provision (old-age provision motive), travels during 
vacation (travel motive), large purchases (large purchases motive), 
education or support of (grand)children (education/support motive), 
bequests to (grand)children (bequest motive), and taking advantage 
of state subsidies (state subsidies motive). I refer to this ordinal 
measure as the absolute importance of a saving motive because 
households are not forced to discriminate between motives and may 
rate each motive as very important or totally unimportant. Indeed, 
the pair wise correlation coefficients between these motives are all 
positive—they range between close to 0 and almost 0.5—and thus, 
some households tend to assign higher scores on average than oth-
ers. If crowding out effects between saving motives are low or non-
existent and thus households who assign higher scores on average 
also consider saving more important, a comparison of absolute 
measures is insightful. But if some households by character or 
chance tend to assign higher scores while others tend to assign lower 
scores (henceforth referred to as ‘individual scaling’) without a con-
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nection to the overall level of importance or if one is interested in 
relative shifts in the importance of different motives in response to 
changes in household characteristics, a relative measure that en-
forces discrimination between the motives would be more meaning-
ful. Such a measure of relative importance of a saving motive is 
constructed by dividing the score given to a particular motive by the 
sum of scores given to all motives.8 Most probably, different levels 
of average importance are a result of both explanations: While some 
variation is due to individual scaling, it is likely that households who 
assign, for instance, an eight on average consider saving more im-
portant than those assigning an average of three. The analyses are 
conducted for both measures since each measure can yield insights 
the other cannot give: The absolute measure can indicate whether a 
particular variable amplifies the overall importance of saving, while 
the relative measure better reflects relative shifts in the importance 
of different motives in response to changes in household characteris-
tics. 
The main advantage of such ‘subjective measures’, which are di-
rectly reported by households, is that item non-response rates are 
negligible due to low cognitive burden (Schunk (2007, pp. 3-4)). A 
common critique is that they are susceptible to misreporting, in par-
ticular if certain responses are socially desired. In the case of saving 
motives, this means that households might, for example, understate 
the importance of the travel motive and overstate the importance of 
the education/support motive. But since this study is more interested 
in changes in the importance of saving motives in response to 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
8 If a household assigns 0 to all motives (52 obs. = 0.7% of the final sample), the 
measure of relative importance is set to 1/9 since all motives are considered equally 
important (just as each was assigned the same positive number). 
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changes in household characteristics rather than in absolute levels of 
importance, this problem might be less severe, at least if the ‘misre-
porting bias’ is similar for all households (i.e., if all households 
overstate the importance of some motive by a one point increment, 
changes in the characteristics still lead to the same changes in im-
portance of saving motives as without overstatement). 
The regularity of saving is surveyed as a direct question as well, 
and households can indicate whether they save regularly a fixed 
amount (henceforth regular fix savers), put money aside each month 
but determine the amount according to the respective financial cir-
cumstances (regular flexible savers), put money aside whenever 
there is something left to save (irregular savers), do not save due to 
financial constraints (no money non-savers) or do not save since 
they prefer to enjoy life now (enjoy life non-savers). 
With respect to the educational level, households are divided into 
two groups, high and low education households. High education 
households are those whose household head has graduated from 
secondary school with ‘Fachhochschulreife’ or ‘Abitur’, which con-
sists of 12 or 13 years of schooling and is equivalent to high school 
graduation. Low education households are all remaining households 
and are headed by graduates from Haupt-, Real- or Polytechnische 
Oberschule (9 or 10 years of schooling). The variable itself is con-
structed as a dummy for Fachhochschulreife/Abitur, FHR_Abitur. 
Note that while this definition relies on the assumption that the edu-
cational level of the person who identifies him-/herself as household 
head is decisive, the conclusions of this study do not change if the 
educational level of a household is defined either as the highest of 
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the educational levels of respondent and partner or as the educa-
tional level of the household member who is indicated to make fi-
nancial decisions, choosing the highest educational level if both 
respondent and partner decide together (this changes the educational 
level for only 6.1% or 5.7% of the households, respectively). 
Moreover, relating education to two schooling groups rather than the 
commonly used highest educational attainment is done for several 
reasons. In Germany, school degrees are related to different school 
types with a different educational goal and thus provide a good indi-
cator, which kind of profession an individual will pursue (e.g., Abi-
tur is a prerequisite for university education). After school, indi-
viduals split up into many different types of higher educational or 
professional training, some of which comprise only a small number 
of observations. As a result, interaction effects would not be meas-
urable with precision. Thus, using FHR_Abitur as an indicator for a 
high educational level is considered to produce two groups of dis-
tinct educational level that comprise enough households for a suffi-
ciently precise estimation. 
For further reference, table A.1 (appendix) gives a description of all 
variables used in the analysis. 
3.3 Imputation and Data Limitations 
Since detailed financial questions are susceptible to item non-
response, an iterative multiple imputation procedure using a 
Markov-Chain Monte-Carlo method has been applied to all waves 
of SAVE (see Schunk (2008) for more information on the proce-
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dure). The goal of this procedure is “to preserve the correlation 
structure of the data set as much as possible” (Schunk (2008, p. 
102)). If this is achieved, imputation can both reduce the item non-
response bias that occurs if observations with and without missings 
differ systematically and increase efficiency (Schunk (2008, p. 
103)). The result of the multiple imputation algorithm are five data-
sets, in which missing values have been replaced by imputed values. 
Since the imputation is stochastic, the five data sets differ with re-
spect to these values, reflecting the uncertainty that is associated 
with imputation. To incorporate this uncertainty into the succeeding 
descriptive and regression based analyses, each dataset is examined 
separately, and the results are combined using Rubin’s method 
(Rubin (1987, pp. 20-22, 81-87; 1996, pp. 476-477), see section 
5.2.1 for some further remarks).  
This short introduction to imputation has been given since there are 
some issues with the SAVE imputation procedure that motivate 
restrictions and adjustments imposed on the sample used for the 
analysis. The problems mainly apply to censored metric variables, 
such as annual saving, which is left-censored at 0. The imputation of 
this variable is conducted in the following steps. First, the probabil-
ity of reporting positive saving is estimated by a probit. Second, if 
the predicted value of this probit estimation is below 0.5 for an ob-
servation reporting a missing, annual saving is set to 0. Otherwise, 
annual saving is imputed by predictions from an OLS regression of 
positive non-missing values of annual saving on a large set of co-
variates. To reflect uncertainty, a random draw from a normal distri-
bution with mean 0 and a standard deviation equal to the standard 
error from the regression is added to the predicted value (henceforth, 
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this is referred to as ‘adding a standard error’ though not the stan-
dard error as such but a random draw is added). Since this may pro-
duce imputed values below 0, the absolute values of further random 
draws are added to the imputed value until it is at least as large as 
the minimum positive non-missing value. The same is done in the 
opposite direction if the imputed value exceeds the maximum non-
missing value. Thus, in the end, all imputed values should lie in the 
range of non-missing values. This so-called ‘shooting’ process is 
applied to prevent the generation of ‘imputation outliers’.  
However, the combination of an OLS regression in levels, adding a 
standard error, and ‘shooting’ is suspected to bias the imputed val-
ues upwards. If we compare the mean of imputed and non-missing 
values of annual saving (upper left corner of table 2), the average 
imputed value is twice to almost four times as high as the average 
non-missing value. Although this is suspect, it is no clear evidence 
for a biased imputation since observations with a missing for annual 
saving may systematically differ in other respects from observations 
that report a value. If this is the case, the difference in the means 
could be a result of the desired correction for item non-response 
bias. Thus, to draw conclusions about ‘imputation bias’, we should 
rather compare the distributions of non-missing values and of those 
values the imputation procedure would generate for these non-
missing values (henceforth referred to as imputed non-missing val-
ues). Since these values are not included in the final data sets, I re-
run the last loop of the imputation of annual saving for each year 
and create imputed values for all observations (lower left corner of 
table 2). While the mean imputed missing value is in the range of the 
mean of the five imputed data sets (the difference is due to the sto-
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chastic elements in the imputation procedure), the imputed non-
missing values are on average much higher than the original non-
missing values and rather in the range of the imputed missing val-
ues. In fact, they are significantly different from the original values, 
but not significantly different from the imputed missing values. This 
is some evidence that the imputation generates an upward bias in 
annual saving.  
Table 2:  Mean Annual Saving: Non-Missing vs. Imputed Values 
 Mean annual saving No. of observations 
SAVE sample 2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007 
Non-missing 2,308 3,482 2,934 2,088 3,168 2,640 
Imputed missing  
(mean over 5 datasets) 4,088 12,838 9,073 217 306 291 
Imputed non-missing  
(5th loop) 3,410 12,407 8,162  
Imputed missing  
(5th loop)  3,774 13,068 9,413  
 
If we reproduce the imputation procedure outlined above step by 
step, it becomes evident where this bias comes from. Figure 2 shows 
the distribution of original non-missing values and imputed non-
missing values over the stages of the imputation procedure, exem-
plarily for 2007 (it is similar for 2005 and 2006). If anything, the 
distribution of original non-missing values (1) resembles a log nor-
mal distribution (with large σ ). Before the standard error is added, 
the distribution of the predicted values from an OLS regression (2) 
rather looks like a normal distribution—apart from the spike at zero, 
which is due to zero values predicted by the preceding probit. While 
the regression preserves the mean, the main problem is the left tail 
below zero. This problem is amplified by adding a standard error 
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(3), which is large due to a poor fit of the regression and ‘stretches 
out’ the entire distribution. That is, most values to which a negative 
(positive) standard error is added become negative (positive). Since 
the shooting process (4) adds absolute, and thus positive values of 
standard errors to those values below zero, positive standard errors 
are added to almost all values in the end—either in stage (3), or in 
stage (4) if the standard error in stage (3) was negative. But adding 
far more positive than negative standard errors along with a large 
standard error results in serious upward bias. 
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Figure 2:  Distribution of Annual Saving over the Stages of the 
Imputation Process—Histogram and Kernel Density of 
Non-Missing Values 
(1) Original Non-Missing Values 
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(2) Imputed Non-Missing Values— 
OLS Predicted Values before Adding a S.E. 
0
1.
0e
-0
4
2.
0e
-0
4
3.
0e
-0
4
4.
0e
-0
4
D
en
si
ty
-30000 -20000 -10000 0 10000 20000 30000
Annual Saving
 
Imputation and Data Limitations 
 
51 
(3) Imputed Non-Missing Values— 
OLS Predicted Values after Adding a S.E. 
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(4) Imputed Non-Missing Values— 
OLS Predicted Values after ‘Shooting’ 
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Note: Values are limited to the range +/- 30,000. 
Source:  SAVE 2007, own calculations. 
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3.4 Sample Restrictions 
The deficiencies of the imputation procedure outlined above create 
the following trade-off: On the one hand, if the imputed values of 
annual saving are included in the sample, they most probably suffer 
from severe overestimation bias. On the other hand, if one excludes 
these values (as in Attanasio & Weber (1995, p. 1125)), the sample 
might suffer from non-response bias. The following arguments have 
let me come to the conclusion that an exclusion of imputed values is 
likely to be the lesser evil. First, the results of section 3.2 suggest 
that an inclusion of the imputed values would fail to reduce the non-
response bias and rather introduce a far more pronounced ‘imputa-
tion bias’. Second, even if the imputation procedure would do a 
better job, there would be a certain danger that it might introduce—
or at least reinforce—a correlation between the dependent variable 
and the regression covariates of the succeeding analysis since the 
imputation uses some of these covariates to predict missing values 
of annual saving. Then, observed partial correlations could in fact be 
a result of the imputation rather than a feature of the original data. 
Thus, observations with imputed annual saving are excluded from 
the sample (814 obs. = 9.3% of the original sample). The imputation 
of the other dependent variables—saving motives and the regularity 
of saving—is considered to induce less problems since due to their 
categorical character, they have been imputed by a hotdeck proce-
dure, which gives no concern for a bias similar to the regression + 
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shooting procedure. Thus, observations with imputed values of these 
variables are used in the analysis.9  
A couple of further adjustments have been applied to the sample, 
which are outlined in the remainder of this subsection. All of these 
have in common that they serve to adjust for outliers, either by re-
ducing obvious measurement error or by correcting for further im-
perfections of the imputation procedure. This is mainly achieved by 
making use of the panel structure of SAVE, which is neglected in 
the original data cleansing and imputation process. Altogether, the 
sample is reduced from 8,710 to 7,847 observations (90.1%). Note 
that all restrictions and adjustments described in this subsection do 
not alter the main results and conclusions of this study.  
Adjustments With Respect to Annual Saving 
First, if a household reports no extraordinary one-time earnings, 
annual saving of and above €100,000 that is at least 50 times bigger 
than its value in the preceding or following year is divided by 100 [7 
adjustments]. In these cases, values are very likely to be reported as 
Euro and Cent amounts but encoded disregarding the decimal point 
(e.g., €2,000.00 is encoded as €200,000).  
Second, a few respondents are likely to have entered a stock value 
(savings) instead of the requested flow figure (saving). To reduce 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
9 The only variable that may raise concern in this context is the importance of the 
old-age provision motive, which a majority of respondents erroneously was not 
asked for in 2007. Since all respondents in 2007 also have been interviewed in 
2006, the imputation is mainly based on the value indicated in the previous year. If 
there are no large shifts in importance, this should yield a good prediction. Those 
who mistrust the predictive power of the imputation procedure may disregard the 
results for the old-age provision motive, but they are included in this thesis for the 
matter of completeness. 
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this problem, observations with annual saving of at least €100,000, 
an annual net income of less than €100,000, and no extraordinary 
one-time earnings are excluded from the sample if they are observed 
in a single year only [1 observation]. 
The author judges this procedure to delete less ‘true’ variation in the 
data than a cut-off at, e.g., the 99 percentile (which is done fre-
quently to reduce the influence of outliers, for instance in Freyland 
(2005b, pp. 34-35)) since some of the extreme values are surpris-
ingly consistent if one compares annual saving with net income and 
the values of extraordinary one-time earnings. All values of at least 
€100,000 [15 observations] have been checked in the data and this 
procedure has been considered best by the author to comply with 
both the need to reduce outliers due to measurement error, which in 
the worst case can drive the results, and the fact that some outliers 
are consistent while making the adjustment process reproducible to 
the critical reader. 
Adjustments With Respect to Net Income 
In the same spirit, net income is adjusted for outliers in five steps. 
The 99 percentile of monthly net income is approximately €10,000 
such that values of and above €10,000 are considered as possible 
outliers [74 observations]. In a first step, the procedure adjusts for 
non-imputed values of and above €10,000 that are at least 10 times 
higher in one year than in the preceding or following year, given 
that the latter has not been imputed. If in addition, the household 
head was at least 30, income is divided by 12 [10 adjustments] since 
it is very likely that the respondent reported annual rather than 
monthly net income. This view is supported by the fact that all of 
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these cases occur in 2005, when the questionnaire was relatively 
new to most respondents and interviewers. Household heads below 
30 are exempted from this correction since such income ‘jumps’ 
may occur when individuals first enter the labor market or at early 
stages of their career. 
In a second step, non-imputed values of and above €10,000 are cor-
rected if they are at least 5 times higher than the value in the preced-
ing or following year, given that the latter has not been imputed, the 
household head is at least 30, and one of the following conditions is 
true: The household head does not report unemployment in the year 
compared to which the value of net income is at least 5 times higher; 
the unemployment question is imputed in one of the years in ques-
tion; or the household head reports unemployment in the year where 
he or she indicates a monthly net income of at least €10,000 [1 ad-
justment]. In these cases, the author considers it very likely that the 
reported value is measured with error and it is replaced by the value 
of the preceding or following year given that one of these values is 
not imputed or to the mean of these values given that they are both 
original.  
In a third step, imputed values of at least €10,000 are set equal to the 
value of the preceding or following year given that one of these 
values is not imputed or to the mean of these values given that they 
are both original [23 adjustments]. Note that the conditions for this 
adjustment are less strict than for non-imputed values due to less 
reliable information. 
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In a forth step, all remaining observations with imputed values of at 
least €10,000, which are at least twice as high as in the preceding or 
following year are excluded from the sample [8 observations]. Fi-
nally, observations are excluded if their imputed monthly net in-
come is at least €10,000 and they are observed in a single year only 
[2 observations]. 
The adjustment and exclusion of imputed values solely at the top 
end of the income distribution may raise concerns that the weight of 
lower income groups in the sample is artificially enhanced. How-
ever, there are three arguments in favor of this procedure. First, be-
cause net income is left-censored, a simple cut-off method, e.g., at 
the 99 percentile, would induce even higher selectivity and delete 
plausible values. Second, the imputation of income is likely to suffer 
from similar though less severe overestimation bias than annual 
saving (less severe since many people indicated an income cluster if 
they refused to report a point estimate, and the imputed value is 
constrained to lie within the borders of the cluster). Thus, correcting 
for huge and implausible imputed values is considered to reduce 
estimation bias since the reduction of ‘imputation bias’ probably 
outweighs possible selection bias. Third, while the imputation tends 
to ‘overshoot’ the actual value there is no evidence that the opposite 
is a problem, i.e., there are no imputed values below €10,000 if the 
(non-imputed) value in the preceding or following year is above 
€10,000. 
Adjustments With Respect to Wealth 
While it seems reasonable to exploit the panel structure of SAVE to 
correct a relatively stable variable like net income—and to a lesser 
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extent annual saving—no convincing and consistent way has been 
found to distinguish ‘true’ and ‘false’ outliers in wealth. Total 
wealth is a sum of many variables with high non-response rates and 
does not tend to be as stable as income in the SAVE data. Reflecting 
this uncertainty about the correctness of specific high and low val-
ues, it was decided to truncate the remaining sample at the 0.5 and 
99.5 percentile of the wealth distribution (19 and 19 observations). 
While this is not completely satisfying, it seems to be better than 
pretending to be able to identify misreported values. 
3.5 Weights and Sample Characteristics 
Weights 
To adjust for sample selection, the descriptive statistics in this sec-
tion and in section 4 are weighted using the corresponding Mik-
rozensus collected by the Statistisches Bundesamt as a representa-
tive reference sample. The weighting criteria used in this study are 
income and household size, i.e., the observations in SAVE are 
grouped into 9 cells according to 3 income and 3 household size 
classes. To obtain the weight of a cell, the relative frequency in a 
cell is divided by the relative frequency in the corresponding cell of 
the Mikrozensus (for more information on the precise calculation of 
weights in SAVE, see Schunk (2006, pp. 17-19) and Börsch-Supan 
et al. (2008, pp. 172-175)). Because of the adjustments outlined in 
section 3.4, the weights have been recalculated for the restricted 
sample. Note that weights are not used for the regression based in-
ference in section 6 since their use is not without controversy in this 
context (Winship & Radbill (1994, pp. 242-247)).   
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Sample Characteristics 
Table A.2 in the appendix shows characteristics of the restricted 
sample, stratified by educational group, weighted, and averaged 
over the 5 imputed datasets (Stratification by year does not reveal 
significant differences between the different waves of SAVE). 
Highly educated household heads appear to be somewhat younger 
on average and consistently have more children living inside their 
household but less children living outside their household than low 
education household heads. With respect to other demographic 
characteristics, they are more likely to be male, non-German, and of 
a better state of health. The latter is probably due to the difference in 
the age distribution, at least in part. They earn and save more on 
average, and are thus able to accumulate larger amounts of total 
wealth.10 As expected, low education household heads are more 
likely to have a blue collar job but less likely to be white collar 
workers, civil servants, freelancers or self employed. This pattern 
also holds if one adjusts for the larger fraction of retired low educa-
tion household heads, which probably reflects the larger fraction 
above age 65. While the unemployment rate is higher among low 
education households, the fraction of households who are in educa-
tion, in an apprenticeship or on parental leave or who do military 
service is higher among high education households. This fits neatly 
the larger fraction of very young households among the highly edu-
cated and the fact that their education lasts longer. The higher frac-
tion of full-time working high education household heads vanishes 
for the most part if one conditions on employment (40.8%/62.2% = 
65.6% vs. 28.3%/46.0% = 61.5%). With respect to other economic 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
10 Note that the extreme values of wealth are close to each other over years and 
educational groups as a result of the truncation described in 3.4 
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and financial characteristics, high education household heads are 
more optimistic about future income prospects and are more likely 
to make regular support payments, to repay mortgages, and to have 
disability insurance. A part of these differences may again be attrib-
utable to high education household heads being younger on average. 
With respect to psychological variables finally, differences are not 
very large, but high education household heads appear to be more 
likely to be optimistic, but less likely to be a creature of habit, to live 
for the moment, and to be a smoker. 
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4 Descriptive Analysis 
This section provides a descriptive analysis of fertility and saving 
behavior, using the restricted sample described in section 3. As an 
introduction, section 4.1 links fertility to household income, age, 
and educational level. Section 4.2.1 presents life cycle profiles of 
income, consumption11, saving, and the number of children living 
in- and outside the household to reproduce the findings of other 
studies and data sets with the SAVE. The same is done for the im-
portance of saving motives in section 4.2.2. Section 4.3 provides a 
more detailed descriptive investigation of the relationship of the 
number of children to annual saving (4.3.1), saving motives (4.3.2) 
and the regularity of saving (4.3.3), respectively, and how this rela-
tionship varies over the parents’ educational level, income, and 
age12. All figures in section 4 are weighted and represent averages 
over the five imputed datasets. Note that any relationships estab-
lished in this section cannot be interpreted as causal relations but 
merely as observed correlations. Thus, if for the matter of legibility, 
it is said that a particular variable increases (decreases) in the num-
ber of children, the correct, but lengthy formulation would be that 
the average value of this variable is higher (lower) in groups consist-
ing of households with more children than in groups of households 
with fewer children. Also note that because of the short observation 
period, it is not possible to distinguish properly between age and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
11 Consumption is calculated as annual net income minus saving. Since the saving 
measure is left censored, consumption is underestimated for households who dis-
save. Thus, the measure is somewhat crude but the best one available. 
12 Since there are only few insights with respect to variation by age, they are dis-
cussed for all three dimensions together at the end of section 4.3. 
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cohort effects, and what is referred to as differences by age could 
also be differences between cohorts. 
4.1 Fertility Behavior by Household Income, Age, and Educa-
tional Level 
Figures 3 and 4 show the average number of children living in the 
household and outside the household, respectively, stratified by the 
household head’s educational level (2 groups; left vs. right hand 
graph), net income (quintiles13), and age (6 groups, different colors 
of bars).  
Figure 3 suggests that low education households get their children 
earlier in life than high education households since especially the 
bars referring to younger age groups tend to be higher.14 However, 
while at the low educational level, households with higher net in-
come tend to get their children later in life, this is not the case at the 
high educational level: Except for the first quintile, fertility in high 
education households rather shifts to younger ages as income in-
creases. Furthermore, for a given age group and a given educational 
level, there appears to be a positive relationship between income and 
the number of children in the household, which is somewhat 
stronger for high education households. Perhaps, more educated 
households judge more carefully whether or not they can afford 
children. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
13 These net income quintiles are calculated for the entire sample, i.e., they are the 
same for both educational levels. 
14 As already pointed out, this might also be a cohort effect if fertility has decreased 
over cohorts at the high educational level but not at the low educational level. 
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Figure 4 suggests that children tend to leave high education house-
holds later in life than low education households. Particularly in the 
second and third income quintile, i.e., with a monthly net income 
between €1,117 and €2,300, most children leave high education 
households after the household head’s age of 55, but considerably 
earlier in low education households (compare the bars referring to 
age group 46-55). If children of highly educated parents tend to 
obtain a higher educational level as well, this could be due to the 
fact that children of high education but lower income households 
stay longer with their parents since they cannot afford setting up 
their own household before entering the labor market (whereas chil-
dren of higher income households can afford that). In the lowest two 
age groups however, the fact that there are more children outside 
low education households might hint to a higher fraction of divorces 
or extramarital children at the low educational level. 
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Figure 3:  Number of Children Living in the Household by In-
come, Age, and Education 
0
.5
1
1.
5
2
N
um
be
r o
f c
hi
ld
re
n 
in
 h
ou
se
ho
ld
1st 2nd 3rd
Net income quintile
4th 5th
Low Education Households
below 26 26-35 36-45
46-55 56-65 over 65
0
.5
1
1.
5
2
N
um
be
r o
f c
hi
ld
re
n 
in
 h
ou
se
ho
ld
1st 2nd 3rd
Net income quintile
4th 5th
High Education Households
below 26 26-35 36-45
46-55 56-65 over 65  
 
Source:  SAVE 2005-2007, restricted sample, weighted, and averaged over the five 
imputed data sets. 
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Figure 4:  Number of Children Living Outside the Household by 
Income, Age, and Education 
0
.5
1
1.
5
2
2.
5
N
um
be
r o
f c
hi
ld
re
n 
ou
ts
id
e 
ho
us
eh
ol
d
1st 2nd 3rd
Net income quintile
4th 5th
Low Education Households
below 26 26-35 36-45
46-55 56-65 over 65
0
.5
1
1.
5
2
2.
5
N
um
be
r o
f c
hi
ld
re
n 
ou
ts
id
e 
ho
us
eh
ol
d
1st 2nd 3rd
Net income quintile
4th 5th
High Education Households
below 26 26-35 36-45
46-55 56-65 over 65  
 
Source:  SAVE 2005-2007, restricted sample, weighted, and averaged over the five 
imputed data sets. 
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4.2 Life Cycle Profiles 
To get a first impression about the effect of children on consump-
tion, saving, and saving motives over the life cycle, the most natural 
thing to do would be to compare life cycle profiles of these variables 
for households with and without children. The main problem with 
this is that there are only very few households younger than 30 with 
children as well as childless households above 45. This makes the 
profiles very unreliable at either earlier or later stages of the life 
cycle and precludes a thorough comparison. Thus, it is proceeded in 
a different way, which is to pool households with and without chil-
dren and to compare the behavior of life cycle profiles of the vari-
ables of interest with the profiles of the number of children in and 
outside the household. This gives at least some intuition about 
whether there is a co- or countermovement over the life cycle. 
4.2.1 Life Cycle Profiles of Income, Consumption, Saving, and 
Children 
To illustrate the evolution of annual net income, consumption, sav-
ing, and the number of children living in and outside the household 
over the life cycle, 13 5-year cohorts, starting with those born 1925-
192915, are constructed and the cohort means of the corresponding 
variables plotted against age, the age of a cohort being set equal to 
the mid point of the youngest and oldest members of the cohort (i.e., 
the cohort born 1960-1964 is assigned age 43 in 2005, 44 in 2006, 
and 45 in 2007). This is done separately for the two educational 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
15 Cohorts born before 1925 (age > 80) are not shown due to very thin data support 
(cell sizes drop below 10 observations). Even so, these cohorts fit in nicely if in-
cluded.  
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groups. Figure A.1 in the appendix shows the result of this cohort 
analysis. The first row corresponds to low education households, the 
second to high education households. The first graph in each row 
refers to income, consumption, and saving and is thus comparable to 
those produced by the literature as outlined in section 2.1. The sec-
ond and third graphs show consumption and saving, respectively, 
along with the number of children in and outside the household. 
Since in some cases, the cohorts constructed consist of only a rela-
tively small number of observations—especially for older cohorts 
and the high education sub sample—the graphs are quite noisy, par-
ticularly for annual saving. Therefore, figure A.2 pools all three 
years and provides the same graphs but with 10 year moving aver-
ages of means over age (thick lines) instead of cohort means.16 To 
reflect the variability of the data, a corridor with limits equal to the 
mean per age group (not the moving average!) +/- one standard error 
is shown as well (thin lines of the same color).17 The resulting age 
profiles are smoother than those of the cohort means, but they might 
confound age, cohort, and year effects. However, because of the 
short observation period, the cohort analysis does not help much to 
distinguish cohort and age effects anyway, and since both variants 
yield similar conclusions, I mainly refer to the moving averages, 
which often give a clearer picture of the overall trend.  
As observed in other data sets, both income and consumption ex-
hibit a similar hump shape over the life cycle and consumption 
seems to track income, peaking around age 45 for low education 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
16 Again, households older than 80 are not shown due to cell sizes below 10 obser-
vations. 
17 Note that the moving average of means may lie outside this corridor since it may 
be smaller or larger than the mean of a particular age group +/- one standard error. 
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households and around age 55 for high education households (1st 
graph). Since consumption is constructed as income minus saving, 
this is due to a relatively flat saving profile: Though saving in-
creases at the beginning of the life cycle and—at least for low edu-
cation households—declines late in life, the hump shape in saving is 
far less pronounced than the one in income. In part, this may be due 
to the left-censoring of the saving measure that precludes dissaving.  
The educational differences in the income profiles are in line with 
common findings. Since on average, household heads with a higher 
educational level enter the job market later than low education 
household heads, they start at age 19 with lower average income but 
face a far steeper income profile at the beginning of their career such 
that they surpass their low education counterparts in the second half 
of their 20s and end up earning almost one and a half times as much. 
In addition, annual saving shows a more pronounced increase in 
younger years and is more than twice as high by age 40. 
Also in line with the literature documented in section 2.1 is the 
hump-shaped life cycle profile of children living in the household 
(2nd graph). Let us first look at low education households. The peaks 
in consumption and the number of children in the household appear 
around the same age, in the late 30s or early 40s. From around age 
45 on, both consumption and the number of children in the house-
hold decline, though consumption declines at a lower rate. If there is 
a positive causal link between the number of children and house-
hold’s consumption, the fact that consumption does not decline as 
fast as the number of children inside the household could be ex-
plained by the rising number of children outside the household. That 
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is, the negative effect of a declining number of children in the 
household could be partly offset by a positive effect of a rising 
number of children outside the household. Since the number of chil-
dren outside the household rises faster than the number of children 
inside the household declines—to a certain extent probably due to 
cohort effects—the positive effect of children on consumption ap-
pears to be much smaller but still present once they have left the 
household. However, that there really is such a causal relationship 
cannot be established in this descriptive analysis. If it exists, the 
increase in saving in the second half of their 50s (3rd graph) suggests 
that low education households shift a part of their income from con-
sumption towards saving once children start to leave the household. 
This would be in line with a stronger bequest motive among older 
low education households with children.  
The pattern of consumption, saving, and children is similar for high 
education households with some important differences. First, as 
already noted in section 4.1, they get their children later in life. Sec-
ond, consumption does not seem to decline as much and appears to 
track the number of children outside the household more closely 
later in life than for low education households (look at the humps in 
both profiles in the late 60s and early 70s). Of course, since we look 
at different cohorts, it could be that both profiles of consumption 
and children are driven by income, i.e., cohorts with higher average 
income consume more and have given birth to more children. If 
however, at least a part of the comovement of consumption and 
children is causal, the fact that consumption tracks the number of 
children outside the household more closely for high education 
households suggests that the effect of children on consumption de-
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creases less than in low education households when children leave 
the household. Further support for this hypothesis can be drawn 
from the observation that saving does not increase when children 
start to leave high education households in their 50s, as it was ob-
served at the low educational level. This would be in line with the 
hypothesis that in high education households, investment in the hu-
man capital of older children is more important than saving for 
physical bequests. 
To summarize, consumption seems to track not only income, but 
also the number of children in the household, and, to a lesser extent, 
the number of children outside the household. While the latter par-
ticularly applies to high education households, low education 
households seem to shift more income from consumption towards 
saving once children have left the household. This fits the educa-
tional immobility story and the resulting hypotheses of section 2.4 
pretty well. 
4.2.2 Life Cycle Profiles of Saving Motives 
Figures 5 and 6 show life cycle profiles of the importance of the 
nine saving motives—for the absolute and relative measure, respec-
tively—along with those of children in and outside the household 
separately for the two educational levels (again, the thick black line 
represents the moving average, the thin lines the corridor con-
structed by the mean +/- one standard error).  
Not surprisingly, the home acquisition motive is particularly im-
portant for young households in both absolute and relative terms, 
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and it is ranked higher by high education households. Its importance 
peaks around age 30—and thus roughly 10 years ahead of the peak 
in the number of children in the household—and continuously falls 
thereafter. Thus, it seems that households anticipate the rise in the 
number of children and the resulting increase in the demand for 
housing and consequently attach more importance to saving for the 
acquisition of a home early in life. Afterwards, the home acquisition 
motive becomes less important as either a home has already been 
acquired or children start to leave the household, reducing the de-
mand for housing.  
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Figure 5:  Life Cycle Profiles of the Absolute Importance of  
 Saving Motives 
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Figure 6:  Life Cycle Profiles of the Relative Importance of Saving  
Motives 
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Source:  SAVE 2005-2007, restricted sample, weighted, and averaged over the five  
imputed data sets. 
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Source:  SAVE 2005-2007, restricted sample, weighted, and averaged over the five  
imputed data sets. 
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Similarly, the large purchases motive starts as quite important at 
the beginning of the life cycle but continuously decreases in abso-
lute and relative importance. In contrast to the home acquisition 
motive, there is no hump at the beginning of the life cycle. Further-
more, shape and level of the profile are very similar for both educa-
tional levels.  
The life cycle profile of the debt reduction motive looks much like 
a right shift of the profile of the home acquisition motive, peaking 
around age 40 just as the life cycle profile of children in the house-
hold. The motive appears to be a bit more important for low educa-
tion households, which may be due to a greater need for borrowing 
to set up a household as a result of lower earnings. 
The travel motive is relatively important early in life before the 
arrival of children and from the late 50s onwards when most chil-
dren have left the household. This U-shape is more apparent for the 
relative measure than for the absolute measure. Beginning in their 
late 60s, low education households attach less importance to the 
travel motive, probably due to their health condition. The same can 
be observed for high education households above age 80 (not shown 
here). 
Combining the observations on the motives home acquisition, large 
purchases, debt reduction, and travel suggests that with respect to 
the consumption of specific goods, households save for the acquisi-
tion of homes and expensive durables primarily at the beginning of 
their life cycle before giving birth to children. Then, they acquire 
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these goods and save for the repayment of resulting debts mainly 
during the years of highest earnings later in their working life. Be-
fore and after the presence of children, households attach more im-
portance to the travel motive. These shifts in the importance of sav-
ing motives are in line with those reported by Harris et al. (2002, p. 
209) for different age groups and constitute some support for the 
hypothesized shift from a children-complement consumption portfo-
lio, dominated by durables, to a children-substitute consumption 
portfolio. 
Together with the old-age provision motive, the precautionary 
motive is the most important motive over the whole life cycle. After 
a rise in early years, its absolute importance is very stable over the 
life cycle and at a very similar level for the two educational groups. 
In relative terms however, there is a continuous rise in the impor-
tance of this motive, particularly in low education households. This 
might hint to an increasing risk aversion in age or for older cohorts.  
In absolute terms, the importance of the old-age provision motive 
displays a slight hump shape over the life cycle, which is more pro-
nounced for low education households. For the relative measure, 
there rather appears to be a slight increase in importance over the 
life cycle, at least up to retirement age. 
For low education households, the profile of the absolute importance 
of the education/support motive exhibits a shape similar to the 
profile of children in the household. That is, it peaks in their late 30s 
and decreases steadily thereafter. This decline cannot be observed 
for high education households, for whom the profile of the educa-
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tion/support motive also seems to track the profile of children living 
outside the household. In terms of relative importance however, the 
profiles are very similar between age 30 and 80 and remain roughly 
stable at about 10%, maybe a bit higher for high education house-
holds.  
The bequest motive shows a reverse pattern: As long as children 
are present in the household, its importance is very low in both ab-
solute and relative terms, but rises when children leave the house-
hold. For the absolute measure, this increase is more distinct in high 
education households, whereas the shapes for the relative measure 
are very similar for the two educational levels. 
Finally, we can observe an educational difference in the importance 
of the state subsidies motive. While it steadily declines in high 
education households, it shows a hump shape for low education 
households, just like the profile of children in the household. This is 
probably due to the fact that many saving subsidies that are related 
to children are more attractive for low income households. 
Combining the observations on the motives precaution, old-age pro-
vision, education/support, bequest, and state subsidies indicates that 
households attach more importance to saving related to their chil-
dren’s education/support when children are present, and to bequest 
saving late in life. Although the absolute importance of the precau-
tionary and the old-age provision motive remains roughly stable or 
even decreases late in life, their relative importance appears to in-
crease over the life cycle. The main difference between the educa-
tional levels is that low education households are more attracted by 
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state subsidies when children are present, whereas high education 
households seem to care more about their children’s education after 
the children have left home. While this is in line with the hypothesis 
that high education households have a stronger taste for the educa-
tion of their children, particularly when children get older, there is 
no support for the hypothesis that low education households attach 
more importance to the bequest motive instead. 
A nice feature of the life cycle profiles is that we get a good impres-
sion of the life cycle variation in saving, saving motives, and the 
number of children. However, we cannot say whether a comove-
ment between, for instance, the home acquisition motive and chil-
dren is really caused by households with children attaching more 
importance to this motive. To investigate this more thoroughly, the 
next subsection stratifies the sample by the number of children and 
some other criteria and looks at the variation in saving behavior over 
the number of children.  
4.3 Saving Behavior and the Number of Children, Income, Age, 
and Education 
4.3.1 Annual Saving 
A major shortcoming of descriptive analyses is the limited capabil-
ity to control for other variables. How important that can be when 
analyzing the relationship between annual saving and children can 
be demonstrated in this subsection. The first row of figure 7 reports 
mean annual saving, stratified by educational level and the number 
of children inside (left) or outside (right) the household, respectively 
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(from 0 to 5 and more children). To limit the influence of outliers, 
which can drive mean saving of groups with many children but few 
observations, annual saving is truncated above the 99.5 percentile 
for the remainder section 4.3.1. The second row of figure 7 shows 
how this affects the results. From these graphs, we cannot say much 
about the relationship between saving and children—if anything, we 
would suppose that there is no relation.  
Figure 7: Annual Saving by the Number of Children and Education 
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Restricted Sample with Additional Truncation at the 99.5 Percentile 
of Annual Saving 
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Source:  SAVE 2005-2007, restricted sample, weighted, and averaged over the five 
imputed data sets. 
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But as observed in section 4.1, households with higher net income 
tend to have more children. Thus, a positive effect of income on 
saving and a negative effect of children on saving could cancel out 
in figure 7. Therefore, figures 8 and 9 additionally stratify by in-
come quintiles. Now, we can make four major observations. First, 
being in a higher income quintile is positively related to annual sav-
ing if the number of children and the educational level is hold fixed 
(i.e., we compare bars of the same color for a particular educational 
level). Second, for a given income quintile and a particular number 
of children in the household, we do not observe a consistent rela-
tionship between the educational level and annual saving (i.e., we 
compare the bars that refer to a particular income quintile and a 
particular number of children between the left and the right graph). 
Though these observations just refer to (conditional) correlations 
and can by no means be interpreted as ceteris paribus effects yet, 
they suggest a level effect of income—but not of education—on 
saving. Third, within each income quintile, annual saving decreases 
in the number of children in the household, at least from the second 
income quintile onwards (figure 8). Households in the lowest in-
come quintile save very little anyway and might thus not be able to 
reduce saving further if the number of children increases. Note that 
there are no obvious educational differences in the relationship be-
tween annual saving and children in the household. Fourth, while 
the negative relationship between saving and children persists when 
children leave high education households (neglecting the outlier in 
the second income quintile), this cannot be observed for low educa-
tion households (figure 9). Here, annual saving remains quite stable 
over the number of children outside the household. In reference to 
the hypotheses of section 2.4, this pattern suggests that education 
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induced self control and cost effects of children cancel out as long as 
children live inside the household, but that education induced cost 
effects prevail after children have left the household. 
As shown, stratification by an additional variable helps to isolate the 
effect of children on saving from the effect of other variables. The 
other side of the coin is that the sizes of cells over which mean an-
nual saving is calculated get smaller, the more variables are strati-
fied by. This makes the mean prone to biases from outliers and 
measurement error and thus less reliable, especially in groups with 
many children, which comprise a small number of observations 
anyway. Therefore, it does not seem reasonable to stratify by more 
than three variables at the same time. Controlling for more variables 
simultaneously will be postponed to the regression based analysis in 
section 6. 
 
Figure 8:  Annual Saving by the Number of Children in the House-
hold, Income, and Education 
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Source:  SAVE 2005-2007, restricted sample with additional truncation, weighted, 
and averaged over the five imputed data sets. 
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Figure 9:  Annual Saving by the Number of Children outside the 
Household, Income, and Education 
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Source:  SAVE 2005-2007, restricted sample with additional truncation, weighted, 
and averaged over the five imputed data sets. 
4.3.2 Saving Motives 
Figure 10 illustrates that for both educational levels, the precaution-
ary and the old-age provision motive clearly rank highest with re-
spect to both absolute and relative importance, followed in low edu-
cation households by the motives debt reduction, large purchases, 
education/support, travel, state subsidies, home acquisition, and 
bequest. In high education households, debt reduction is considered 
a bit less important, while large purchases, home acquisition, and 
travel are attached more importance. However, these ‘educational’ 
differences could well be due to high education households being 
younger on average. Especially with respect to the most and least 
important saving motives, this ranking is similar to the one found by 
Reil-Held (2007) in SAVE 2001-2006 and it is in line with the find-
ings of Harris et al. (2002, pp. 208-209) in Australian data, except 
for the fact that particularly the motives travel and home acquisition 
were ranked higher in the latter. 
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Figure 10:  Absolute and Relative Importance of Saving Motives 
by Education 
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Source:  SAVE 2005-2007, restricted sample, weighted, and averaged over the 
five imputed data sets. 
If we plot the mean absolute importance of saving motives against 
the number of children inside the household (upper half of figure 
11), we can observe very similar patterns for both educational 
groups. The absolute importance of the motives large purchases, 
precaution, and old-age provision remains roughly constant over the 
number of children. If anything, there is a slight hump shape. For 
the motives home acquisition, debt reduction, bequest, and state 
subsidies, the absolute importance increases up to the third or fourth 
child and declines thereafter. This decline is a bit more pronounced 
for low education households. Not surprisingly, the importance of 
the education/support motive rises sharply with the first child, but 
remains quite constant thereafter, maybe slightly increasing for the 
high education sub sample. Finally, the travel motive declines in 
importance over the number of children in low education house-
holds while remaining roughly constant in high education house-
holds.  
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Since the absolute importance of most saving motives exhibits a 
more or less pronounced hump shape over the number of children in 
the household, it seems that the competition among different saving 
motives is highest for households with some but not too many chil-
dren. If this is taken into account by looking at the relative rather 
than the absolute importance of saving motives (figure 12, left 
graph), it is not surprising that the relationship between children in 
the household and the relative importance of most saving motives is 
less pronounced than for the absolute measure, and that the increase 
in competition goes at the expense of motives with a constant abso-
lute importance over the number of children in the household (pre-
caution, old-age provision, and large purchases), now showing a 
decreasing or slightly U-shaped pattern.  
The mean absolute importance of most saving motives stratified by 
the number of children outside the household (lower half of figure 
11) is again very similar for the two educational groups and does not 
change very much over the number of children. While the motives 
education/support and bequest are somewhat more important for 
households with some children outside the household, the motives 
home acquisition, large purchases, debt reduction, and state subsi-
dies are somewhat more important for households without any chil-
dren outside the household. However, this might be due to the fact 
that the ‘no children outside the household’ group contains young 
households whose children are still all present in the household. 
With respect to the relative importance of saving motives, similar 
observations hold (figure 12, right graph).  
Comparing the relative measure of importance for children in and 
outside the household yields another interesting observation. The 
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relative importance of some motives, like home acquisition and state 
subsidies, increases over groups with more children in the household 
but decreases over groups with more children outside the household, 
whereas the relative importance of other motives, such as travel and 
precaution, shows a reverse pattern. This suggests that households 
attach more importance to some motives while children are present 
and to compensate for that after children have left the household. 
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Figure 11: Absolute Importance of Saving Motives by Children 
and Education 
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Children outside the Household 
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Source:  SAVE 2005-2007, restricted sample, weighted, and averaged over the five  
imputed data sets. 
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Figure 12: Relative Importance of Saving Motives by Children 
and Education 
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Source:  SAVE 2005-2007, restricted sample, weighted, and averaged over the 
five imputed data sets. 
Figure 13 to 15 additionally stratify by income quintiles. In general, 
similar patterns than without stratification by income quintiles (fig-
ures 11 and 12) can now be observed for a given income quintile. 
However, the relationship between the absolute importance of some 
saving motives and the number of children in the household (figure 
13) exhibits some tendency to get weaker as one moves up the in-
come distribution.18 This would be in line with the theoretical hy-
pothesis that income alleviates the effect of children on saving mo-
tives.  
Turning to the relation between the absolute importance of saving 
motives and children outside the household (figure 14), income 
seems to matter in some cases. For low education households and a 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
18 For example, look at the absolute importance of the home acquisition motive in 
low education households in figure 13. While the mean absolute importance of this 
motive increases by 5 from about 3 to 8 between the ‘no children’ group and the 
group with the highest mean (4 children), this increase approximately halves if we 
compare the corresponding groups at the top income quintile (no children vs. 3 
children). 
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given number of children, the absolute importance of all motives is 
positively related to income. That is, among the less educated, high 
income households appear to attach more importance to saving in 
general than low income households. For high education house-
holds, income seems to matter for the relation between children 
outside the household and the motives home acquisition and debt 
reduction: While in all income quintiles, the first child is associated 
with a decline in importance, the importance rises again for house-
holds with more than one child in the lowest two income quintiles, 
but keeps falling in the upper three income quintiles. If this finding 
is not driven by outliers, it could mean that low income households 
with many children outside the household have to make more effort 
to accumulate the starting capital for buying a home and for the 
repayment of debts thereafter. 
With respect to the relative importance of saving motives (figure 
15), similar conclusions than without stratification by income quin-
tiles (figure 12) hold within most income quintiles. The only qualifi-
cation is that households in higher income quintiles tend to attach 
more relative importance to the motives home acquisition and travel, 
but less to the precautionary motive. 
Descriptive Analysis 
 
92 
Figure 13: Absolute Importance of Saving Motives by Children in 
the Household, Income, and Education 
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High Education Households 
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Source:  SAVE 2005-2007, restricted sample, weighted, and averaged over the five  
imputed data sets. 
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Figure 14: Absolute Importance of Saving Motives by Children 
outside the Household, Income, and Education 
 
Low Education Households 
0
2
4
6
8
10
A
bs
ol
ut
e 
im
po
rta
nc
e
1st 2nd 3rd
Net income quintile
4th 5th
Home Acquisition
0
2
4
6
8
10
A
bs
ol
ut
e 
im
po
rta
nc
e
1st 2nd 3rd
Net income quintile
4th 5th
Large Purchases
0
2
4
6
8
10
Ab
so
lu
te
 im
po
rta
nc
e
1st 2nd 3rd
Net income quintile
4th 5th
Debt Reduction
0
2
4
6
8
10
Ab
so
lu
te
 im
po
rta
nc
e
1st 2nd 3rd
Net income quintile
4th 5th
Travel
0
2
4
6
8
10
A
bs
ol
ut
e 
im
po
rta
nc
e
1st 2nd 3rd
Net income quintile
4th 5th
Precaution
0
2
4
6
8
10
A
bs
ol
ut
e 
im
po
rta
nc
e
1st 2nd 3rd
Net income quintile
4th 5th
Old-age Provision
0
2
4
6
8
10
Ab
so
lu
te
 im
po
rta
nc
e
1st 2nd 3rd
Net income quintile
4th 5th
Education/Support
0
2
4
6
8
10
Ab
so
lu
te
 im
po
rta
nc
e
1st 2nd 3rd
Net income quintile
4th 5th
Bequest
0
2
4
6
8
10
Ab
so
lu
te
 im
po
rta
nc
e
1st 2nd 3rd
Net income quintile
4th 5th
State Subsidies
 
 
 
Saving Behavior and the Number of Children, Income, Age, and Education 
 
95 
 
 
 
High Education Households 
0
2
4
6
8
10
Ab
so
lu
te
 im
po
rta
nc
e
1st 2nd 3rd
Net income quintile
4th 5th
Home Acquisition
0
2
4
6
8
10
Ab
so
lu
te
 im
po
rta
nc
e
1st 2nd 3rd
Net income quintile
4th 5th
Large Purchases
0
2
4
6
8
10
Ab
so
lu
te
 im
po
rta
nc
e
1st 2nd 3rd
Net income quintile
4th 5th
Debt Reduction
0
2
4
6
8
10
Ab
so
lu
te
 im
po
rta
nc
e
1st 2nd 3rd
Net income quintile
4th 5th
Travel
0
2
4
6
8
10
Ab
so
lu
te
 im
po
rta
nc
e
1st 2nd 3rd
Net income quintile
4th 5th
Precaution
0
2
4
6
8
10
Ab
so
lu
te
 im
po
rta
nc
e
1st 2nd 3rd
Net income quintile
4th 5th
Old-age Provision
0
2
4
6
8
10
Ab
so
lu
te
 im
po
rta
nc
e
1st 2nd 3rd
Net income quintile
4th 5th
Education/Support
0
2
4
6
8
10
Ab
so
lu
te
 im
po
rta
nc
e
1st 2nd 3rd
Net income quintile
4th 5th
Bequest
0
2
4
6
8
10
Ab
so
lu
te
 im
po
rta
nc
e
1st 2nd 3rd
Net income quintile
4th 5th
State Subsidies
 
 
 
 
Source:  SAVE 2005-2007, restricted sample, weighted, and averaged over the five  
imputed data sets. 
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Figure 15: Relative Importance of Saving Motives by Children, 
Income, and Education 
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Source:  SAVE 2005-2007, restricted sample, weighted, and averaged over the five 
imputed data sets. 
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4.3.3 Regularity of Saving 
According to figure 16, a clear majority of households saves a fixed 
amount on a regular basis. However, the fraction of regular fix sav-
ers is almost 10% higher among high education households (46% 
vs. 37%), while the opposite is the case for no money non-savers 
(17% vs. 25%). The fractions of regular flexible savers (14%), ir-
regular savers (21-22%) and enjoy life non-savers (3%) are strik-
ingly similar for both educational levels.  
Figure 16: Regularity of Saving by Education  
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Source:  SAVE 2005-2007, restricted sample, weighted,  
and averaged over the five imputed data sets. 
Stratifying by the number of children in and outside the household, 
respectively (figure 17), we can observe that also for a given number 
of children, the fraction of regular fix savers is higher in high educa-
tion households, while the fraction of no money non-savers is lower. 
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Moreover, for a given level of education, the fraction of regular fix 
savers increases over the number of children in the household up to 
the 2nd or 3rd child at the expense of all other saver types. After-
wards, the fraction of regular fix savers appears to be negatively 
related to the number of children in the household, and the fraction 
of no money non-savers increases. This suggests that children ini-
tially increase the household’s willingness to commit to regular sav-
ing, but once the number of children passes some threshold (e.g., 3 
children), the financial burden makes it difficult to adhere to regular 
saving and a rising fraction of households is unable to save. How-
ever, the graphical analysis may be confounded by self selection 
problems, e.g., households with higher income or smoother income 
profiles may be more likely to give birth to children and save more 
regularly at the same time, which would explain the initial increase 
in the fraction of regular fix savers. Indeed, the fraction of house-
holds with children rises continuously from the first (58%) to the 
fifth income quintile (85%). Moreover, if we stratify by income 
quintiles (figure 18), it becomes evident that higher income house-
holds tend to save more regularly. As a result, the hump shape in the 
fraction of regular fix savers over the number of children in the 
household is less pronounced within income quintiles, and there 
rather is a negative trend, at least in the fraction of all regular savers 
(i.e., those saving either a fixed or a flexible amount). However, the 
pattern within income quintiles is quite volatile (especially for the 
smaller sample of high education households). More obvious is that 
the fraction of no money non-savers increases in the number of chil-
dren in the household. Overall, these findings suggest a negative 
relationship between regular saving and the number of children in 
the household. However, this negative relationship seems to be 
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weaker in higher income quintiles, at least at the low educational 
level. Also note that in the regression based analysis, which controls 
for income and income variability, no evidence is found that the first 
2 or 3 children increase the probability of regular fix or regular 
flexible saving. Instead, a negative effect is found for each child. 
This further hints to the conclusion that the initial increase in the 
fraction of regular savers in the left-hand graph in figure 17 is due to 
the fact that higher income households are both more likely to have 
children and to save more regularly. 
With respect to children outside the household, the right-hand graph 
in figure 17 suggests that their number is negatively related to sav-
ing a fixed amount, but positively related to saving irregularly or not 
at all. However, once income is accounted for (figure 19), there is 
less evidence that children outside the household are negatively 
related to the regularity of saving. 
Overall, these observations suggest that children induced (negative) 
cost effects on the regularity of saving outweigh possible (positive) 
self control effects—at least as the number of children gets large. 
This negative effect appears to get weaker when children leave the 
household.  
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Figure 17: Regularity of Saving by the Number of Children and 
Education 
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Source:  SAVE 2005-2007, restricted sample, weighted, and averaged over the five 
imputed data sets. 
 
Figure 18: Regularity of Saving by Children in the Household, 
Income, and Education 
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Source:  SAVE 2005-2007, restricted sample, weighted, and averaged over the five 
imputed data sets. 
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Figure 19: Regularity of Saving by Children outside the House-
hold, Income, and Education 
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Source:  SAVE 2005-2007, restricted sample, weighted, and averaged over the five 
imputed data sets. 
Stratification by Age Groups 
Since this study investigates heterogeneity in the effect of children 
not only with respect to income and education but also with regard 
to age, the sample was also stratified by age groups (instead of in-
come) in addition to the number of children and the educational 
level. However, this does not yield many additional conclusions 
such that it is not discussed in detail (figures A.3 to A.9 in the ap-
pendix; note that because of very thin data support, the graphs for 
children in (outside) the household omit the highest (lowest) age 
group). Worth noting is that for very young households, children 
outside the household are negatively related to the level and the 
regularity of saving as well as to the absolute importance of most 
saving motives. This can probably be explained by the fact that chil-
dren outside very young household are likely to be connected to 
divorce or extra-marital birth and the financial burden of mandatory 
support payments. Also, very young households generally save less 
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than older ones, and for a given age group, more educated house-
holds save more, but this might just as well be an income effect. 
Summary of Main Results 
To conclude this section, let us briefly summarize the main results 
of section 4.3.  
Once differences in income are accounted for, we find the expected 
negative relationship between annual saving and the number of chil-
dren in the household, which appears to be independent of the edu-
cational level. When children leave the household, this negative 
relationship persists only in high education households. Also, higher 
income households save more, and very young households save less 
than older ones, especially if they have children outside the house-
hold. 
With respect to saving motives, the number of children in the 
household is positively related to the absolute importance of the 
motives home acquisition, debt reduction, education/support, be-
quest, and state subsidies, but negatively to the travel motive. While 
the absolute importance of the motives large purchases, precaution, 
and old age provision appears to be unaffected, these motives de-
crease in relative importance since children intensify the competi-
tion among saving motives. While educational differences are negli-
gible, the children-saving-relationship gets weaker in income. When 
children leave the household, their influence on most motives seems 
to vanish.  
Finally, children in the household seem to be negatively related to 
regular saving once we account for income. Income as such is posi-
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tively related to regular saving and weakens the influence of chil-
dren. When children leave the household, their effect appears to get 
weaker as well. 
While these findings are mostly consistent with the theoretical hy-
potheses or suggest that children induced cost effects outweigh chil-
dren induced self control effects, remember that all potential rela-
tionships between children, education, and saving behavior pro-
posed so far do not need to be causal and could very well be driven 
by other variables not controlled for if these variables are correlated 
with the stratification variables considered in this section. Thus, a 
regression based inference that ideally takes into account all relevant 
variables is clearly warranted. 
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5 Econometric Models and Issues 
This section describes the econometric models and methods applied 
to measure heterogeneity in the effect of children on saving behavior 
(5.1) and discusses possible econometric issues (5.2).  
5.1 Econometric Models 
5.1.1 Types of Models Applied 
Since the distribution of annual saving resembles a log-normal 
distribution (figure 20, left), it is transformed into (natural) logs for 
the regression based analysis. Taking logs is supposed to reduce 
both the problems of outliers and heteroskedasticity, but because 
annual saving is reported as 0 for a large fraction of the sample, it 
requires annual saving to be scaled up by 1 Euro. The distribution of 
log annual saving (figure 20, right) resembles a normal distribution 
except for the peak at 0, which results from the left-censoring of 
saving. This left-censoring is taken into account by estimating a 
Tobit type I model for log annual saving, i.e., observed log annual 
saving (yi) reflects the latent variable actual log annual saving (yi*) 
only if it is positive and equals 0 otherwise:  
(6) 0
0
0 ≤
>
⎩⎨
⎧ +=
= *yif
*yif'x*yy
i
iiii
i
εβ  
(Wooldridge (2002, pp. 517-521)) 
[xi is a vector of explanatory variables, β  a vector of coef-
ficients, and ε i an error term.] 
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Figure 20: Distribution of (Log) Annual Saving—Histogram and 
Kernel Density 
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Source:  SAVE 2005-2007, restricted sample. 
The absolute importance of saving motives is surveyed as an ordi-
nal variable and thus an ordered probit model is appropriate, i.e., the 
observed variable yi is related to the latent variable yi* via ten un-
known threshold values µ1<…<µ10 in the following manner:  
(7) iii 'x*y εβ +=  (Wooldridge (2002, pp. 504-508)) 
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In this model, a positive (negative) sign of an element of β  indi-
cates that a variable shifts probability mass towards higher (lower) 
categories of the dependent variable. 
Calculating the relative importance of saving motives implicitly 
assumes equal distances between different categories and yields 
Econometric Models 
 
107 
values on the [0, 1] interval for each motive. To restrict predicted 
values to this interval, a two-sided Tobit model is applied, i.e.: 
(8) 
1
10
0
1
0
>
∈
<
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
+==
*yif
],[*yif
*yif
'x*yy
i
i
i
iiii εβ  
The five categories measuring the regularity of saving do not imply 
an obvious ranking. While regular fix and regular flexible savers 
obviously save more regularly than irregular savers or no money 
non-savers, there is no clear-cut ordering between the first two cate-
gories, to say nothing of the category enjoy life non-savers. Thus, a 
multinomial logit model for unordered categories is applied to this 
variable, as also done in Schunk (2007, pp. 17-20). In this model, 
the response probability for each category j = 1, …, J is given by 
(9) 
∑
==
=
J
h
hi
ji
ii
)'xexp(
)'xexp(
)x|jy(P
1
β
β
 
(Wooldridge (2002, pp. 497-499)).  
In order to identify the model, the elements of the coefficient vector 
of the base category, which is chosen to be no money non-savers, 
are set to 1. Regarding the estimation technique, all models pre-
sented in this subsection can be estimated by maximum likelihood. 
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5.1.2 Econometric Equations 
The basic econometric equation that is substituted for β'xi  or 
ji 'x β , respectively, in equations (6) to (9) is the following, sup-
pressing subscripts i and j19: 
(10)
ε
ββββ
β
β
β
βββ
+
++++
−×⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+
−×⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+
×⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+=
yearpsychofinancesociodemo
)age(h_out_children
h_in_children
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Abitur_FHRh_out_children
h_in_children
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h_in_children'x
'
Y
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'
F
'
SD
'
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where children_in_h and children_out_h denote the number of chil-
dren living inside and outside the household, respectively, which 
both enter interacted with a dummy for a high educational level of 
the household head (FHR_Abitur), annual net household income 
(netinc), and the age of the household head (age). The latter two are 
rescaled to their sample means to get meaningful estimates of β C 
(i.e., at mean age and mean income instead of zero age and zero 
income). Since the effect of children might be non-linear, modifica-
tions of this specification have been run for each dependent variable. 
First, the number of children has been split up into one variable be-
ing 1 or 2 if the household has one or two children and zero other-
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
19 Note that the constant term, β0, is set to 0 in the ordered probit estimation of 
equation (7) to identify the model. 
, 
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wise (children_in_h_12, children_out_h_12) and another variable 
being 3, 4, 5, … if the household has more than 2 children and 0 
otherwise (children_in_h_3+, children_out_h_3+). That is, the 
marginal effect of the first and second child is allowed to differ from 
the effect of succeeding children. The second modification distin-
guishes the effects of less than 4 and more than 3 children in the 
same way (children_in_h_123, children_out_h_123, chil-
dren_in_h_4+, children_out_h_4+). Third, two children dummies 
(child_in_h, child_out_h) have been included along with the number 
of children to test whether only the presence or the number of chil-
dren matters. Since each of these modifications doubles the quantity 
of children variables, the interaction effects have been restricted to 
the educational level in these cases. Otherwise, the estimation would 
become increasingly imprecise. To avoid a huge number of mostly 
redundant tables, only the specification that appeared to be most 
suitable is reported.   
Besides the educational level of the household head, the vector so-
ciodemo contains other sociodemographic characteristics that are 
assumed to have an influence on saving behavior: age (quadratic) to 
capture age and cohort effects; female to control for gender differ-
ences in taste; east as a dummy for residence in Eastern Germany to 
control for the still different (economic) environment in the newly 
formed German States; foreign as a dummy for non-German citizen-
ship to account for cultural differences in taste and the special situa-
tion of foreign citizens; partner as a dummy for sharing the house-
hold with a partner to capture household size effects other then those 
related to children; and good_state_of_health as a dummy for a 
good health condition since this is supposed to affect not only pre-
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sent and future income opportunities but also utility derived from 
different consumption goods and thus saving behavior. 
Since there is no direct measure of permanent income and the panel 
is too short to construct one from averages as done frequently, the 
vector finance includes current net income in quadratic form (netinc, 
netinc2) along with a number of subjective measures regarding past 
income variability (high_inc_var, low_income_var) and future in-
come prospects, in particular the subjective probability of a raise in 
income (increased_inc_prob) and of receiving a major gift or heri-
tage that would significantly improve the households financial situa-
tion (highheritage_prob). To control for positive transitory income 
shocks, dummies for exceptional one-time earnings below and 
above two times monthly net income (except_earn_low, ex-
cept_earn_high) are included, not counting tax refunds, which often 
occur each year, are to a certain extent predictable, and thus not 
really unanticipated transitory shocks. Exposure to exceptional fi-
nancial burdens on the other side is accounted for by including 
dummies for making regular support payments to persons outside 
the household (pay_support) and paying off a home loan (re-
pay_homeloan) or mortgage (repay_mortgage). The latter two also 
account for the possibility that people might not consider loan re-
payments as saving. Further measures of exposure to income risk 
are a dummy for a temporary work contract (job_contract_l) and the 
subjective probability of becoming unemployed in the near future 
(probjobloss). Job dummies (blue_collar, white_collar, 
civil_servant, self_employed, freelancer) might also reflect exposure 
to income risk, but since people self select into different occupa-
tions, they might rather reflect different tastes towards risk. Other 
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proxies for risk aversion are dummies for having occupational dis-
ability insurance (insur_disability) and liability insurance (in-
sur_liab). Furthermore, finance includes dummies for full-time, 
part-time, and minor employment (work_full, work_part, 
work_little), retirement (retired), unemployment (unemployed), and 
homeownership (homeowner) as well as total wealth (quadratic), 
which can reflect differences in the households’ general taste for 
saving or discount rates (Browning & Lusardi (1996, p. 1845)).  
Besides sociodemographic and financial characteristics, heterogene-
ity in saving behavior might be due to psychological factors 
(Browning & Lusardi (1996, p. 1850)). Thus, the vector psycho 
consists of a small set of psychological variables that are supposed 
to capture the influence of certain character traits on the taste for 
saving. These variables are dummies that rely on the respondent’s 
self description and concern the household’s optimism, planning 
horizon (living for the moment rather than planning the future 
(easy_going), spontaneous rather than observant (spontaneous)), and 
tendency to behave like a creature of habit (habit). In addition, a 
smoker dummy is supposed to account for differences in time pref-
erences (Khwaja at al. (2006, pp. 674-676), Khwaja et al. (2007, pp. 
942-946)). live_shorter and live_longer are dummies for the expec-
tation to live shorter or longer than a person of the same age on av-
erage and thus constitute a subjective measure of individual life 
expectancy. Finally, year consists of two dummies for households 
observed in 2005 and 2007, respectively, and controls for time ef-
fects on the dependent variable. 
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As already mentioned at the end of section 2.3, applying the same 
specification of β'x  to each of the dependent variables is not postu-
lated to be the most appropriate one could think of to explain each 
variable separately. Rather, the specification has been chosen to 
explain the level of annual saving as well as possible, both with 
respect to theoretical considerations and the fit of the specification. 
Then, the same specification has been applied to saving motives and 
the regularity of saving to shed more light on the channels on which 
the explanatory variables affect annual saving (a method similar to 
the one applied by Smith and Ward (1980, p. 247)). This is consid-
ered more insightful than including saving motives and the regular-
ity of saving in the regression of annual saving, since the latter ne-
glects that the three dimensions are probably jointly determined and 
would also take away the indirect effect that some explanatory vari-
ables, e.g., children, have on annual saving via changing the impor-
tance of saving motives or the regularity of saving.   
5.2 Econometric Issues 
5.2.1 Calculation of Standard Errors 
Two features of the SAVE data make the computation of correct 
standard errors of regression coefficients non-trivial. First, because 
of time invariant individual specific effects, the error terms of re-
spondents that are interviewed repeatedly are likely to be serially 
correlated. This serial correlation can be taken into account if we 
regard observations on the same household in different years as one 
cluster and allow the error terms within each cluster to be correlated. 
Assuming the matrix of regressors, X, to be exogenous, this affects 
the variance-covariance matrix of the estimated coefficients, 
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11 −−
= )X'X(X)'(E'X)X'X()bvar( εε , in the following way: If 
all observations were independent, )'(E εε = σ ²I since all diagonal 
elements of )'(E εε are σ ² and all off-diagonal elements are zero, 
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j. With clustering, )(E jiεε  with i ≠ j is allowed to differ from zero 
if observations i and j belong to the same cluster (Rogers (1993, pp. 
19-20), Wooldridge (2002, pp. 328-331)). 
Second, stochastical multiple imputation makes it necessary to ac-
count not only for the variability of the estimated coefficients within 
one dataset (the so-called within-imputation variability (WIV)) but 
also between the five imputed datasets (between-imputation vari-
ability (BIV)). Therefore, Rubin’s method (Rubin (1987, pp. 20-22, 
81-87; 1996, pp. 476-477)) is applied, i.e., the variance- 
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5.2.2 Endogeneity of Fertility Behavior 
The interpretation of the estimated coefficients of the children vari-
ables as causal effects and not just as partial correlations crucially 
depends on the assumption that fertility behavior is exogenous to 
saving behavior. There is some concern in the literature that causa-
tion might run in both directions, i.e., that the ability and willingness 
to save affect the number of births as well as vice versa, or, even 
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more likely, that both are jointly determined (Smith & Ward (1980, 
p. 247), Cigno & Rosati (1996, pp. 1561-1562), Angrist & Evans 
(1998, p. 451), Schultz (2007, p. 3)). Joint determination means that 
households jointly decide upon both the saving profile and the num-
ber of children given birth to based on other household characteris-
tics, some of which are commonly unobserved, e.g., exposure to 
risk, risk aversion, time preferences, and other kinds of tastes. In any 
of the two cases, observed partial correlations could not be inter-
preted as pure causal effects from one variable on the other. If, for 
instance, more risk averse households save more but give birth to 
fewer children and risk aversion is not appropriately controlled for, 
the causal effect of children on saving would be biased downwards, 
i.e., a negative effect of children would be overestimated in absolute 
terms.  
One common way to deal with endogenous variables is instrumenta-
tion. One of the most prominent instruments for fertility are twins or 
multiple births, which can be regarded as exogenous ‘shocks’ to 
fertility (see, e.g., Rosenzweig & Wolpin (1980a, b), Angrist & Ev-
ans (1998, pp. 469-473), Black et al. (2005b, pp. 681-683)). Other 
instruments are a woman’s experience of miscarriage on first preg-
nancy, which is negatively related to the number of children ever 
born (Schultz (2007, p. 23)), and the sibling sex composition, as-
suming that parents prefer a mixed sex composition and are thus 
more likely to have another child if present children are of the same 
sex (Angrist & Evans (1998, pp. 456-458), Black et al. (2005b, pp. 
676-677)). However, all these instruments have significant draw-
backs. Twins occur infrequently resulting in small sample sizes 
(Schultz (2007, p. 17)) and are in fact more likely for older women 
Econometric Issues 
 
115 
(Angrist & Evans (1998, p. 458)). In addition, twins may differ in 
their effect from the separate birth of two children. If this is the case, 
the effect identified with twins would not be representative for the 
effect of children in general. Miscarriages occur more frequently 
than twins but are likely to be reported with error, which makes the 
instrument rather weak (Schultz (2007, p. 23)). Finally, sibling sex 
composition is a weak instrument as well since it depends on tastes 
regarding the children sex mix that might be heterogeneous in the 
population. In fact, differences in the probability of getting another 
child between same sex sibling households and mixed sex sibling 
households turn out to be small (Angrist & Evans (1998, p. 457), 
Orbeta (2006, p. 7)). A further disadvantage of this instrument is 
that the sample is restricted to households with at least two children. 
This is critical since it yields small samples for industrialized coun-
tries and identifies the effect only for more than two children, which 
might be different from the effect of the first and second child. 
In my opinion, no convincing and readily applicable way has been 
found to deal with the endogeneity problem. As a result, many stud-
ies mention the problem but do not even pretend to deal with it (e.g., 
Smith & Ward (1980), Attanasio & Weber (1995), Harris et al. 
(2002), Freyland (2005b)). If instruments are applied, there usually 
is some evidence for endogeneity in the context of labor market 
behavior. Commonly, the effect of instrumented fertility on labor 
supply is smaller than without instrumentation but has the same sign 
and is still significant (see, e.g., Angrist & Evans (1998, pp. 466-
467)). How much of this reduction is due to weak instruments and 
measurement error is an open question. According to Schultz (2007, 
p. 40), there is much less empirical evidence on the effect of exoge-
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nous shifts in fertility on saving, but the little existent evidence sug-
gests that using instruments does not change the sign of the effect. 
I think there is some reason to believe that the endogeneity problem 
might not be so severe in my analysis. First, at least in the short 
term, the impact of fertility on saving is probably stronger than in 
the other direction since fertility decisions are longer ranged than 
saving decisions in the sense that the latter can be revised, whereas 
the decision to get a child cannot be reversed once the child is born. 
In other words, at a given point of time, the number of children is 
more likely to affect annual saving than vice versa, though there 
might be some feedback. Second, the problem of joint determination 
is reduced since measures of risk aversion, exposure to risk, time 
preferences, and other character traits are explicitly controlled for. 
Bearing all that in mind, it seems justifiable to refrain from the use 
of instruments for the most part of the analysis. Instead, it is consid-
ered more fruitful to run ordinary regressions, keeping in mind that 
the actual causal effects might be bit smaller than the observed par-
tial correlations but presumably have the same sign. To provide 
some support for this view, section 6.4 introduces a different ap-
proach to instrument fertility than the ones described above. The 
results suggest that accounting for endogeneity via instrumentation 
does not change the main conclusions of this study. 
5.2.3 Omitted Variables and Further Specification Issues 
While the specification allows for some heterogeneity in the effect 
of children with respect to their household affiliation as well as their 
parents’ income, age, and education, some potential heterogeneity is 
still unaccounted for. For instance, as former empirical evidence in 
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section 2.3 has pointed out, the effect of children in the household is 
likely to vary with the children’s age, which unfortunately is not 
observed in the SAVE data. As a result, the analysis might confuse 
the effects of the children’s age and the parents’ age, which are 
likely to be positively correlated but to affect saving in different 
directions. There are further variables that might moderate the effect 
of children on saving and could be correlated with the ones con-
trolled for (education, income, and age), like the marital status of the 
household head, the duration of the marriage or partnership, the 
spacing of births, and other characteristics of the children like their 
gender and state of health. Most of these variables are not observed 
in the data but even if that was the case, the sample size would make 
it difficult to control for all possible interaction effects. 
Another problem is that saving is a result of an intertemporal deci-
sion, and thus, children may cause households to save less during 
some stages of the life cycle but more during other stages. Such 
intertemporal variation in the effect of children can only very imper-
fectly be accounted for by controlling for whether children live in or 
outside the household and an interaction of the children variables 
with the parents’ age.  
However, despite these imperfections, the analysis can yield a first 
impression about whether there is considerable heterogeneity in the 
effect of children and if it is worth to do further research in this di-
rection. 
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6 Results 
This section describes and discusses the estimation results of the 
equations introduced in section 5.1 (6.1 – 6.3) as well as the con-
struction of an instrument for fertility and the associated results 
(6.4). Finally, these results are used to adjust saving and consump-
tion profiles for the number of children (6.5). If not otherwise indi-
cated, statistical significance refers to the one percent level. 
6.1 Annual Saving 
For annual saving, the best specification of the children effect turns 
out to be a linear one since the effect of an additional dummy is both 
statistically and economically insignificant and the per child effect 
of more than 2 or more than 3 children does not differ much from 
the per child effect of up to 2 or up to 3 children. Since the depend-
ent variable is measured in logs, this linear specification implies a 
constant relative effect of an additional child on annual saving. 
In the first column of table A.3, the number of children in and out-
side the household is interacted solely with the educational level of 
the household head. The results indicate that children in the house-
hold have a negative impact on annual saving: Holding all other 
covariates constant, the difference in the log of annual saving be-
tween low education households with n and n+1 children is esti-
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mated as -0.72220, implying that an additional child reduces the level 
of annual saving by just over 50% (exp(-0.722) – 1 = -0.514). This 
effect is significant and does neither economically nor statistically 
significantly differ between the educational levels.  
Children outside the household are estimated to reduce annual sav-
ing by roughly one fourth per child for low educational households 
(a log difference of -0.279 implies a reduction of 24.3% per child). 
While the effect is still significantly different from 0, it is also sig-
nificantly smaller than the effect of children in the household as a 
Wald Test indicates. This does not hold for high education house-
holds, for which the total effect of a child outside the household 
amounts to -0.717 or -51.2%. This is significantly larger than for 
low educational households and very close to the effect of a child in 
the household (-0.708 or -50.7%), from which it does not signifi-
cantly differ.  
This finding essentially fits the results of the descriptive analysis in 
section 4.3.1: Children have a significant negative effect on annual 
saving, but while this effect diminishes in low education households 
when children leave the households, it remains roughly at the same 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
20 The reported coefficients correspond to marginal effects in the latent variable 
model, i.e., x
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, since one is 
ultimately interested in what happens to the observed variable that is restricted to be 
above 0. In the case of annual saving however, the left-censoring is a relict of the 
way the data was collected (respondents could not indicate dissaving) rather than an 
inherent feature of the variable of interest itself. Thus, in this special case, we are 
ultimately interested in what happens to the latent rather than the observed variable 
in response to changes in x. 
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level in high education households. This suggests that education 
induced cost effects outweigh education induced self control effects 
after children have left the household.  
This pattern of educational interaction effects still holds when the 
number of children is additionally interacted with net income (col-
umn 2). Furthermore, there is evidence that income alleviates the 
negative effect of children on annual saving since the coefficients of 
children in and outside the household interacted with income are 
both positive and significant at the 5 percent level. In numbers, earn-
ing an additional €1,000 per year reduces the negative effect of chil-
dren on saving by 0.8 percentage points (no matter whether the chil-
dren live in or outside the household). This means that a low educa-
tion household needs an income of somewhat more than €32,000 
above the mean income of €26,700 for the effect of children outside 
the household on saving to turn positive, while a high education 
household would need almost an additional €100,000. Thus, educa-
tional level and net income work in different directions and the edu-
cational difference in the effect of children is not due to differences 
in income. 
Additional interaction with age (column 3) does not change the find-
ings for the interaction effects of children with the educational level 
and net income. It further suggests that older households save less 
per child in the household than younger ones, but more per child 
outside the household. However, note that only the latter effect is 
significant. Nevertheless, a positive correlation between the age of 
the household head and the age of his/her children could explain the 
first interaction effect if the cost of a child living in the household 
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rises in the child’s age, as it is commonly found (see, e.g. Espen-
shade (1974, p. 375)). Then, the finding would suggest that older 
children deter more from saving than younger children. This rela-
tionship reverses when children have left the household, since they 
get more and more financially independent from their parents as 
they get older, finish education, climb up the upward sloping life 
cycle income profile, and have successfully set up their own house-
hold. Instead of spending money on their children, older households 
might actually save for bequests, but whether this is the case will be 
investigated in the next subsection.  
Before turning to the effect of children on the importance of saving 
motives, let us have a look at the coefficients of the other covariates. 
With few exceptions that will be pointed out, they are very similar 
across the three specifications. The coefficients of age and age2—
both significant in columns 1 and 2—imply a negative, but in abso-
lute terms diminishing effect of the household head’s age on saving. 
The effect of age does not turn positive until the age of 90, which is 
almost beyond the age range observed. However, once interacted 
with the number of children, the level effect of age and age2 gets 
insignificant, mainly due to smaller estimated coefficients (column 
3). The coefficients of other demographic characteristics indicate 
that households headed by a woman save significantly less at the 5 
percent level, while those located in the east of Germany, shared 
with a partner, and/or reporting a good state of health save signifi-
cantly more (east is significant only at the 10 percent level).  
As expected, current annual net income exhibits a significant posi-
tive, but deminishing impact on annual saving, not turning negative 
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until an annual income of more than €456,000, which is more than 
17 times above the mean. With respect to past income variability, 
only high_income_var shows a significant effect, which is negative. 
This conflicts with the hypothesis that for a fixed income, higher 
income uncertainty should induce more saving. However, a negative 
coefficient might be explicable if either selection into occupations 
with high income variability is negatively related to risk aversion 
and prudence and thus to the taste for (precautionary) saving 
(Browning & Lusardi (1996, p. 1837)) or if high past income vari-
ability is caused by severe disruptions in a persons life, which deter 
from saving. The fact that civil servants, though having the safest 
jobs, save significantly more than the base group (farmers, family 
members working in family business, willingly not in paid employ-
ment but not retired) and insignificantly more than other occupa-
tional groups, holding income and the other covariates constant, 
gives some credibility to the first supposition. Unemployed house-
hold heads save significantly less than the base group, which might 
be due to the incentives set by social security, which essentially 
discourages saving by setting upper wealth limits for the receipt of 
financial support. This could also explain why expected future un-
employment (probjobloss) does not induce higher, but lower saving, 
significant at the 10% level. Retirement has a significant positive 
effect on saving, but since income is hold fixed, this does not con-
tradict the intuition that households save less when they retire and 
encounter a significant reduction in income. Considering that this 
coefficient compares retirees to non-retired (and probably younger) 
base group members, the positive sign of the coefficient might be 
explained by different consumption portfolios, especially with re-
spect to the acquisition of expensive durable goods, which is usually 
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less important for retirees than for young households. Quite surpris-
ingly, regular support payments to other households encourage sav-
ing, but this is significant at the 10% level only in column 3. Possi-
ble explanations are that households who make these payments ei-
ther expect them to increase in the future, e.g., in the case of support 
payments to children in education, or build up a buffer to be able to 
afford them in ‘bad times’. This would be in line with the LCPIH or 
at least its theoretical extensions. Also in line with this theory are 
the highly significant and positive coefficients on the dummies for 
one-time earnings, indicating that a significant share of positive 
transitory income shocks is transformed into saving. With respect to 
the discussion in section 3.2 whether households regard home loan 
and mortgage repayments as saving, their negative, though insignifi-
cant, coefficients suggest that households do not. 
Furthermore, if the possession of liability insurance is a good meas-
ure for risk aversion, its significant positive coefficient is line with 
theory. The same applies to the negative effect of being a smoker if 
this is a signal for a high discount factor. Other psychological vari-
ables also affect saving in a significant and quite intuitive way. Peo-
ple with a shorter planning horizon (easy_going, spontaneous) save 
less, whereas optimistic and habitual people save more. Surpris-
ingly, the expectation to live either longer or shorter than the aver-
age increases saving, but only the effect of live_shorter is signifi-
cant. A priori, one would have expected those with a higher life 
expectancy to save more but those with a lower life expectancy to 
save less (Bloom et al. (2003, pp. 320-321)). Considering that a 
majority of household heads expects to live as long as the average 
(almost exactly 2/3), the observed pattern could indicate that either 
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people who expect to live shorter more readily anticipate the future 
financial burden of medical treatment or that household heads re-
porting an expectation other than ‘as long as average’ are those 
spending more time on thinking and worrying about the future and 
thus those who save more. Finally, the positive, but decreasing ef-
fect of wealth is consistent with heterogeneity in discount rates or 
the general taste for saving. Since wealth is a result of saving, it is 
potentially endogenous. However, removing it from the list of co-
variates does not lead to severe changes in the results. 
Overall, the outlined pattern of coefficients, in particular with re-
spect to the children variables and their interactions, has proven 
quite robust to changes in the specification. Except for those vari-
ables, with which the children variables were interacted, i.e., 
FHR_Abitur, netinc, and age, all other covariates can be removed 
without changing the overall pattern of children effects. Further-
more, the pattern is not sensitive to adding a variety of variables, but 
these variables are either insignificant (e.g., the number of grand-
children, dummies for persons living in the household other than 
children and partner, past unemployment, past smoker, voluntary 
social engagement, long-term health problems, keeping record of 
income and expenditures, possession of business wealth as well as 
direct measures on the attitude towards financial risk and future 
health expectations) or potentially endogenous to saving behavior 
(e.g., having a fixed saving goal, keeping a minimum amount on the 
current account, and a dummy for credit refusal to capture liquidity 
constraints). 
Results 
 
126 
Also, estimating a Tobit model with random effects (column 4) in-
stead of a pooled cross section Tobit with clustering, does not 
change the conclusions. The coefficients tend to be a bit lower in 
absolute terms, but are more precisely estimated, resulting in higher 
t-values for most coefficients. In addition to the coefficients de-
scribed above, the negative effect of foreign and the positive effects 
of highheritage_prob, pay_support and live_longer are now signifi-
cant at the 5 or 10 percent level, respectively, whereas probjobloss 
and white_collar are not significant any more. 
6.2 Saving Motives 
Table A.4 reports the results for the effect of children on the impor-
tance of saving motives (complete regression outputs are available 
from the author upon request). As a common reference point, col-
umns 1 (absolute measure) and 3 (relative measure) refer to a linear 
specification of children, interacted with FHR_Abitur only, while 
columns 2 and 4 show either the results for additional interaction 
with income and age or for one of the non-linear specifications of 
children if this is found to be more appropriate than a linear one 
(home acquisition, education/support, bequest, state subsidies). Note 
that repay_homeloan and repay_mortgage are not included in the 
equations of the motives home acquisition and debt reduction, where 
they are probably endogenous.  
Home Acquisition Motive 
At the low educational level, children in the household encourage 
saving for the acquisition of a home in both absolute and relative 
terms. In high education households, this is not the case up to the 
Saving Motives 
 
127 
second child, but having a high education has a significant positive 
effect on the importance of this motive regardless of the number of 
children. Thus, it seems that high education households attach more 
importance to the home acquisition motive anyway, while in low 
education households, it gains in importance only when children are 
present. Children outside the household have a significant effect 
only in high education households, which is negative up to the sec-
ond child. Interactions with net income and age are not found to be 
significant and not reported here. 
Large Purchases Motive 
The number of children in the household has a negative effect on 
both the absolute and relative importance of the large purchases 
motive, which hints towards large purchases being mainly children-
substitutes. This applies even more so to high education households, 
though the educational difference is significant only for the absolute 
measure. Children outside the household also reduce the importance 
of this motive, but significantly less so. When additionally inter-
acted with age and net income, these interaction terms are positive 
and almost all significant, indicating that the negative effect of chil-
dren in and outside the household on the importance of the large 
purchases motive diminishes in absolute terms as a household earns 
more or gets older.  
Debt Reduction Motive 
As expected, the importance of the debt reduction motive increases 
in the number of children in the household. This effect is signifi-
cantly stronger in high education households, at least for the relative 
measure. When children have left the household, the effect on the 
Results 
 
128 
relative measure persists only in high education households while 
becoming insignificant in low education households. However, in 
childless households the motive is significantly less important at the 
high educational level. While there appears to be no significant in-
teraction with age, the interaction terms with income are signifi-
cantly negative, indicating that children have less of an effect on the 
importance of the debt reduction motive in high income households. 
Travel Motive 
Independent of the educational level, the number of children in the 
household has a large and significant negative effect on both the 
absolute and relative importance of the travel motive, while there is 
no significant effect of children outside the household. Again, 
higher income (significantly) and age (insignificantly) reduce the 
effect of children on the importance of this motive. 
Precautionary Motive and Old-age Provision Motive 
Like in the descriptive analysis, only little evidence is found for an 
effect of children on the absolute importance of these motives—
only the negative effect of children outside the household on the 
old-age provision motive is significant. In contrast, the relative im-
portance of these motives is significantly reduced by the number of 
children in the household, regardless of the educational level. When 
children leave the household, the negative effect on the precaution-
ary motive persists only in high education households, while the 
negative effect on the old-age provision motive per-sists in both 
educational groups, but gets significantly smaller. Finally, high edu-
cation households generally attach more importance to the old-age 
provision motive than low education households, but there is not 
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much evidence for an interaction effect of children with age or in-
come. 
Education/Support Motive and Bequest Motive 
With respect to these motives, the specification with an additional 
dummy is considered most appropriate since the large and highly 
significant effect of the dummy indicates that most of the positive 
effect on these motives can be attributed to the first child. For the 
absolute measure, additional children exhibit no significant effect, 
while for the relative measure, additional children in the household 
have a significant positive, but much smaller effect than the first 
child. For the bequest motive, it does not seem to matter whether 
children live in or outside the household (both dummy coefficients 
are very similar), whereas the effect on the education/support motive 
is significantly lower for children outside the household. This sug-
gests that investments in the children’s human capital play a larger 
role when children are young, while the importance of investments 
in the children’s physical capital seems to be unaffected by the chil-
dren’s age. 
State Subsidies Motive 
Up to the third child, the number of children in the household sig-
nificantly increases the absolute and relative importance of the state 
subsidies motive, but only in low education households. Children 
outside the household do not appear to have a significant effect.  
Looking at the results from a bit farther distance, we can conclude 
that children in the household increase the absolute importance of 
most saving motives, thereby intensify the competition among them, 
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and shift the relative importance towards home acquisition, debt 
reduction, education/support, bequest, and state subsidies, at the 
expense of large purchases, travel, precaution, and old-age provi-
sion. When children leave the household, their effect usually gets 
weaker. There is not much evidence that the effects of children are 
more persistent in high education households, but some evidence 
that income and—to a lesser extent—age alleviate these effects. 
Table A.5 gives an overview over other selected covariates, report-
ing only the sign of significant effects to get a general idea of the 
overall pattern. Households headed by a woman and shared with a 
partner attach more, while Eastern German households attach less 
absolute importance to most saving motives, which suggests that the 
former have a stronger, the latter a weaker taste for saving in gen-
eral. However, these characteristics play less of a role for explaining 
shifts in relative importance: Households headed by a woman attach 
less relative importance to the motives home acquisition and large 
purchases. The same applies to Eastern German households, who, in 
addition, attach more relative importance to the education/support 
motive. Thus, while the effects of female and east on the overall 
importance of saving go in opposite directions, they have very simi-
lar effects on the relative importance of saving motives. This dem-
onstrates that both measures are meaningful. Furthermore, sharing 
the household with a partner increases the relative importance of the 
state subsidies motive but decreases the relative importance of the 
precautionary motive, which actually makes sense considering intra-
household risk sharing (Lusardi (1998, p. 453)). Also quite intui-
tively, healthy households rather save for large purchases and travel 
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at the expense of debt reduction and precaution, which is reflected 
by both measures of importance.  
With respect to age, the findings for both measures of importance 
are very similar but deviate in part from those generated by the life 
cycle profiles in section 4.2.2, which did not control for other vari-
ables. The effect on the importance of the old-age provision motive 
is positive up to a very high age, while the effect on the importance 
of the motives large purchases and debt reduction is hump-shaped, 
peaking around age 45 for the absolute measure and shortly after 
retirement for the relative measure. By contrast, the effect of age on 
the motives home acquisition, education/support, and bequest is 
negative over the whole life cycle, except for the bequest motive, for 
which it becomes positive at high ages.  
Net income affects the importance of the home acquisition and the 
travel motive positively, at the expense of the state subsidies motive. 
Households who experienced more income variability tend to attach 
more importance to the motives home acquisition and debt reduc-
tion, but this could also reflect a non-linear age effect (not captured 
by age and age2) since households commonly experience more in-
come variation early in life. Expecting an improved income situation 
increases the importance of the motives home acquisition and be-
quest at the expense of the precautionary motive, which is quite 
intuitive. 
Households with regular support payments attach more absolute 
importance to most saving motives; in relative terms however, the 
motives education/support and bequest gain in importance at the 
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expense of the motives travel, precaution, and old-age provision. 
The obligation to repay home loans and mortgages, which is 
strongly positively correlated with the motives home acquisition and 
debt reduction, consistently reduces the importance of most other 
saving motives except for state subsidies. Similarly, unemployment 
reduces the absolute importance attached to most saving motives, 
but in relative terms, only the motives travel, education/support, and 
bequest are negatively affected in favor of the motives debt reduc-
tion, precaution and, astonishingly, old-age provision. In contrast, 
households with a higher risk aversion as indicated by possessing 
occupational and/or liability insurance and those with higher wealth 
generally attach more absolute importance to most saving motives. 
In the case of wealth, this applies to all but the debt reduction mo-
tive, which renders some credibility to the hypothesis that wealth 
reflects the general taste for saving. Homeownership consistently 
increases the relative importance of debt reduction, home acquisi-
tion, and state subsidies, at the expense of travel, precaution, and 
old-age provision.  
With respect to character traits, being a creature of habit and being 
optimistic increases the absolute importance of most saving motives, 
while the opposite is the case for the indicators of having a short 
planning horizon, especially easy_going. In relative terms, habitual 
people attach less importance to the travel motive but more to the 
precautionary motive, which is consistent with intuition. Spontane-
ous people on the contrary save for large purchases and travel rather 
than for home acquisition, precaution, and old-age provision. Fi-
nally, smokers attach more importance to the debt reduction motive 
and less to the motives home acquisition, large purchases, and 
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travel, but causality might actually run in the opposite direction, i.e., 
people might smoke because they have large debts and no money 
left to save for large purchases and travel. 
6.3 Regularity of Saving 
Just as for annual saving, no significant evidence is found against a 
linear specification of the number of children in the estimation of 
the regularity of saving. The results are reported in table A.6. The 
coefficients in the upper table (A.6 (a)) refer to the marginal effects 
on the log odds ratio between the category indicated in the header 
and the base category (no money non-saver). More generally, mar-
ginal effects on the log odds ratio between categories j and k are 
calculated by 
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(Wooldridge (2002, pp. 497-499).   
Since taking logs is a strictly positive monotone transformation, we 
can conclude that an explanatory variable increases the probability 
of being saver type j relative to being a no money non-saver if β j is 
positive and relative to another saver type k if ( β j – β k) is positive. 
Since this does not tell us how the unconditional probability of be-
ing a certain saver type responds to changes in the explanatory vari-
ables, marginal effects of the children variables and FHR_Abitur on 
this probability have been calculated at the means of the explanatory 
variables (lower table, A.6 (b)). 
Results 
 
134 
The results suggest that households are increasingly deterred from 
regular saving as the number of children rises. Interestingly, chil-
dren inside the household affect the probability of regular fix saving 
relative to regular flexible saving positively, while it is the other 
way around for children outside the household. Indeed, if marginal 
effects on unconditional probabilities are computed (A.6 (b)), chil-
dren inside the household have a significant negative effect only on 
the probability of regular flexible saving but not on the probability 
of regular fix saving, while it is the other way around for children 
outside the household. Maybe, expenditures on children in the 
household occur more regularly and are thus easier to plan (housing, 
clothing, food), whereas expenditures on children outside the house-
hold occur rather infrequently (e.g., support when expensive dur-
ables are bought). However, both children in and outside the house-
hold significantly increase the probability of no money non-saving. 
While there is no evidence for educational differences in the effect 
of children in the household, the positive effect of children on no 
money non-saving (and thus the negative effect on the regularity of 
saving) diminishes significantly stronger at the low educational level 
when children leave the household. Finally, children in the house-
hold reduce the probability of enjoy life non-saving relative to no 
money non-saving, which is not surprising. 
To summarize, there are three conclusions worth noting. First, chil-
dren deter households from regular saving and increase the probabil-
ity that households do not save at all. Second, children inside the 
household reduce the probability of regular flexible saving in the 
first place, while children outside the household reduce the probabil-
ity of regular fix saving. Third, in low education households, the 
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negative effect of children on the regularity of saving diminishes 
significantly stronger than in high education households when chil-
dren leave the household. 
With respect to the additional interactions of children with age and 
net income, it appears that the negative effect of children on the 
regularity of saving is lower for higher income households and, in 
the case of children outside the household, older households, but the 
interaction effects are mostly insignificant. 
Regarding age effects, older households are more likely to be either 
regular fix savers or no money non-savers than one of the other 
saver types. This is consistent with the presumption that older 
household experience fewer income variability and generally have 
less need for large acquisitions and are thus either or not able and 
willing to save a constant fraction of their income. Also quite intui-
tively, health, net income, and retirement have a significant positive 
effect on the regularity of saving, while high income variability, the 
obligation to repay home loans or mortgages, and unemployment 
have a negative effect. With respect to tastes and personal traits, 
those with a higher risk aversion (insur_disability, insur_liab), a 
stronger taste for saving (wealth), and greater optimism save more 
regularly, whereas those with a shorter planning horizon (spontane-
ous, easy_going) or a higher discount factor (smoker) save less regu-
larly.  
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Summary and Discussion of the Main Results 
Let us summarize the empirical results of sections 6.1 to 6.3, which 
illustrate that children play an important role for explaining house-
hold saving behavior. Most findings are in line with the theoretical 
hypotheses of section 2.4:  
? Cost effects appear to outweigh self control effects since on 
average, children have a negative effect on the level and the 
regularity of saving. Children also shift the relative importance 
towards the saving motives home acquisition, debt reduction, 
education/support, bequest, and state subsidies, at the expense 
of large purchases, travel, precaution, and old-age provision. 
This shift results from children intensifying the competition 
among saving motives by increasing the absolute importance 
attached to most of them, which causes the precautionary and 
the old-age provision motive to decline in relative importance 
although their absolute importance is not significantly affected 
(in fact, the coefficients are insignificant positive). Except for 
the precautionary motive, the effects are in line with the hy-
potheses of section 2.4 and suggest, furthermore, that large pur-
chases are mainly children substitutes. 
? In low education households, the negative effects of children on 
the level and the regularity of saving diminish after children 
have left the household but stay significant. There is more per-
sistence in high education households, for which the effects of 
children outside the household on the level and the regularity of 
saving are significantly stronger than in low education house-
holds. The fact that there are no significant educational differ-
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ences in the effect of children inside the household, but a 
stronger effect of children outside the household at the high 
educational level suggests that education induced self control 
effects and education induced cost effects of children cancel out 
for children in the household, while the latter prevail for chil-
dren outside the household. This supports the hypothesis that 
higher parental education induces higher investments in the 
children’s human capital and thus higher expenditures on older 
children. 
? Unfortunately, the pattern is not as clear-cut for the importance 
of saving motives in this respect. The interaction effects of 
children and the educational level are mostly insignificant, and 
only for the relative importance of the debt reduction and the 
precautionary motive, there is some evidence for more persis-
tence in high education households. Especially the educational 
interaction effects on the relative importance of the motives 
education/support and bequest are somewhat disappointing. If 
one calculates the total effect of children on these two motives 
using the results from table A.4, column (4), and compares 
them between educational levels (table 3), there is some weak 
evidence that for most of the children groups, high education 
households attach more relative importance to the educa-
tion/support motive than low education households, but less to 
the bequest motive. This would be in line with the idea of inter-
generational educational immobility, but since most of the in-
teraction effects are insignificant, it is not really convincing. 
Maybe, educational differences in the effects are confounded 
by a tendency to give answers that are socially desired.  
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Table 3:  Total Effect of Children on the Relative Importance 
of the Motives Education/ Support and Bequest 
 Education/Support Bequest 
 children_in_h children_out_h children_in_h children_out_h 
  L.E. H.E. L.E. H.E. L.E. H.E. L.E. H.E. 
No children 0.0000 0.0085 0.0000 0.0085 0.0000 -0.0018 0.0000 -0.0018 
1 child 0.0654 0.0723 0.0391 0.0388 0.0340 0.0271 0.0333 0.0224 
2 children 0.0726 0.0810 0.0393 0.0433 0.0380 0.0319 0.0309 0.0229 
3 children 0.0798 0.0896 0.0395 0.0477 0.0420 0.0367 0.0285 0.0235 
4 children 0.0869 0.0982 0.0397 0.0522 0.0460 0.0415 0.0261 0.0240 
5 children 0.0941 0.1069 0.0400 0.0566 0.0501 0.0463 0.0238 0.0245 
? As expected, higher net income tends to alleviate the negative 
effect of children on the level and the regularity of saving and, 
though less significant and not always reported, also the effect 
of children on the importance of most saving motives. The 
same applies to age when interacted with the number of chil-
dren outside the household, with the qualification that this in-
teraction effect is insignificant for most saving motives. It sug-
gests that children tend to be less of a burden the longer they 
have left the household and thus the more likely they are to 
make their own living. The interaction effect of age and chil-
dren in the household is insignificant in most cases, which may 
suggest that higher cost effects of older children (given that 
older parents tend to have older children) and the effect of a 
progressive transformation to a children-substitute consumption 
portfolio cancel out for most dependent variables.  
6.4 Instrumentation 
As mentioned in section 5.2.2, there is some concern that fertility 
might be endogenous. Therefore, this subsection attempts to exam-
Instrumentation 
 
139 
ine whether endogenous fertility behavior leads to serious biases in 
the results presented so far. The examination is limited to annual 
saving, which is of most interest among the three dimensions of 
saving behavior considered. Since instruments are hard to find and 
often weak, the following procedure is applied to remove, or at least 
reduce endogeneity:  
First, the sample is split up into 72 cells depending on age (6 groups 
as in section 4.1), the educational level (2 groups), whether or not 
the household is shared with a partner (2 groups), and the municipal 
type (3 groups). The municipal type variable is a consolidation of an 
original variable with 10 categories and reflects whether a house-
hold lives in the core of a municipality with at least 100,000 inhabi-
tants (type 1), outside the core of a municipality of that size or in a 
municipality of 50,000 to below 100,000 inhabitants (type 2), or in a 
municipality with less than 50,000 inhabitants (type 3). This con-
solidation from originally 10 to 3 groups is based on two goals: 
First, to get groups of roughly equal size, and second, to consolidate 
subgroups with a similar number of children. Indeed, the average 
number of children is very similar across subgroups within each of 
the three consolidated municipality types, but rises from type 1 to 3, 
i.e., fertility rises from city cores to rural regions. 
In a second step, the variable cih_cell is constructed. For a particular 
household, this variable equals the average number of children in 
other households that belong to the same cell as the particular 
household. Similarly, the variable coh_cell equals the average num-
ber of children outside other households in the same cell. The idea is 
that within a given cell, other members of the same cell represent a 
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reference group for the fertility behavior of a specific member. That 
is, other households of the same age, educational level, and partner 
status, who live in a similar environment (municipality type), func-
tion as a ‘peer group’ for a particular household, and the fertility 
behavior of the peer group affects its own fertility behavior. Indeed, 
the cell mean of the number of children in (outside) the household 
excluding the current observation is positively correlated with the 
number of children of the current observation, with a Pearson corre-
lation coefficient of 0.501 (0.523). This appears to be some justifica-
tion to consider the average number of children in and outside other 
households of the same cell (henceforth simply referred to as the 
cell mean (cih_cell, coh_cell)) as an instrument for the number of 
children of a particular household.  
In order to be a valid instrument, the cell mean has to satisfy two 
conditions (Wooldridge (2002, pp. 84-85)). First, it has to be par-
tially correlated with the individual number of children once all 
other exogenous explanatory variables are controlled for. This ap-
pears to be the case because if we regress children_in_h on cih_cell 
and all the other explanatory variables, the coefficient of cih_cell is 
significant on all conventional levels with an F-value of 402.4, and 
if the same is done for children_out_h and the instrument coh_cell, 
coh_cell is significant as well with an F-value of 79.921.22 Second, 
the instrument must be uncorrelated with the error term, which also 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
21 These values refer to the first of the five imputed datasets but are similar 
for the other ones.  
22 Since more than one variable is instrumented in the regression, we cannot 
use the Staiger-Stock rule of thumb (Staiger & Stock (1997)) that the instru-
ment is weak if the corresponding F-value of the first stage regression is 
smaller than 10. Nevertheless, the high F-values are some evidence that the 
instruments are not weak. 
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implies that the only causal impact of the instrument on the depend-
ent variable works through the instrumented variable. This should be 
satisfied if the number of children of other households in a cell can 
be considered as exogenous for a particular household and if the 
number of children of other households in the same cell as such has 
no causal effect on the saving behavior of a particular household. 
The most critical assumption in this line of argumentation is that the 
cells created by the stratification criteria constitute a reference group 
for fertility behavior but not for saving behavior as well. Otherwise, 
variation over cell means could capture a causal effect of the saving 
behavior in the reference group on individual saving behavior. Since 
three of the four stratification criteria (age, education, partner status) 
are explicitly controlled for in the equation of annual saving, the 
crucial assumption is that the municipal type creates variation that 
affects individual fertility but not saving behavior. While I cannot 
prove this assumption, the fact that average saving in a cell is much 
weaker correlated with individual saving (Pearson correlation coef-
ficient of 0.15) than average fertility with individual fertility gives 
some credit to this assumption. 
Thus, though far from being perfect, there is some reason to con-
sider the cell mean as a valid instrument to capture exogenous varia-
tion in fertility and one can estimate a Tobit model for log annual 
saving with endogenous regressors, i.e., 
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where yi denotes observed log annual saving and yi* the correspond-
ing latent variable; ci is the vector of endogenous variables, i.e., the 
children variables; x1i is the vector of exogenous regressors, i.e., all 
other explanatory variables; x2i is the vector of additional instru-
ments, i.e., the cell means for the children variables; and γ  and β  
are structural parameters, while Π 1 and Π 2 are matrices of parame-
ters in the equation for the endogenous variables, which is written in 
reduced form (Wooldridge (2002), pp. 530-533)). 
Such a model can be estimated by maximum likelihood using the 
Newton-Raphson algorithm as optimization technique (table A.7). 
Since the log-likelihood function may not be concave, convergence 
is very slow and gets slower, the more variables are instrumented. 
Therefore, specification 1 estimates the model without any interac-
tion of the number of children but instruments children_in_h and 
children_out_h with the corresponding cell means. Specification 2 
adds an interaction with FHR_Abitur, but this already requires more 
than 80 iterations of the algorithm to get stable results. 
In specification 1, children in the household have a negative impact 
on annual saving despite in-strumentation, which is significant at the 
10 percent level. The coefficient is even a bit larger than the ordi-
nary Tobit estimate, but far less precisely estimated because of the 
inefficiency resulting from instrumentation. The effect of children 
outside the household is considerably smaller and insignificant, but 
in the range of the ordinary Tobit estimate for low education house-
holds. 
When interacted with the educational level (column 2), the coeffi-
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cients get even less precise. Those on children in the household are 
negative, but insignificant. For a low educational level, the effect of 
children outside the household is positive, but insignificant as well. 
This positive sign deviates from the ordinary Tobit estimation but 
would actually be in line with the hypothesis that low education 
households save for physical bequests to older children rather than 
further investing in the children’s human capital. Anyway, the core 
result is that at the high educational level, children outside the 
household have a negative effect on saving (0.533+(-1.132)= -
0.599), which does not significantly differ from the effect of chil-
dren inside the household (-0.476+(-0.385) = -0.861), and that the 
educational difference in the effect of children outside the household 
is significant at the 1 percent level. Finally, with respect to other 
covariates, the coefficients show a similar pattern than without in-
strumentation. 
What we essentially get from this exercise is that using instruments 
yields a similar, though less precise pattern of the effects of children 
on saving than an ordinary Tobit. This gives some credibility to 
interpreting the ordinary Tobit estimates as causal effects. At least, 
there is no evidence that endogenous fertility would bias them so 
seriously that we would have to discard the main results found in 
sections 6.1 to 6.3 as driven by endogenous fertility behavior.  
6.5 Adjusted Life Cycle Profiles of Consumption and Saving 
In section 4.2.1, it was shown that consumption seems to track cur-
rent net income since both follow a pronounced hump shape over 
the life cycle. This is at odds with the prediction of the basic version 
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of the LCPIH. Sections 2.1 and 2.2 developed that a positive effect 
of children on the marginal utility of consumption is a possible ex-
planation for the hump-shaped consumption profile, which could 
reconcile the theoretical prediction and the empirical evidence. And 
indeed, it was found in section 6.1 that for a given income level, the 
number of children depresses annual saving and thus increases 
household consumption. Thus, it appears natural to adjust the life 
cycle profiles of saving and hence consumption for the effect of 
children and to check whether adjusted consumption still tracks 
current income. Of course, this is somewhat of a back-of-the-
envelope calculation since, as pointed out in section 5.2.3, intertem-
poral and life cycle variation in the children effect is likely to be 
insufficiently modelled due to data limitations. Nevertheless, it is 
interesting to see whether or not the hump shape in consumption is 
significantly reduced. 
Using the estimated coefficients on the number of children in and 
outside the household and on their interactions with the educational 
level, income, and age from column (3) of table A.3, log annual 
saving is adjusted for the number of children related to the house-
hold, i.e., 
ln(savingadj+1) = ln(saving+1)  
– [–0.848 – 0.068*FHR_Abitur + 0.009*(netinc – 
26.7) – 0.013*(age – 51)] *children_in_h  
– [–0.480 – 0.560*FHR_Abitur + 0.010*(netinc – 
26.7) + 0.020*(age – 51)]*children_out_h.  
The corresponding level of adjusted annual saving contains a few 
huge outliers that would have an overwhelming impact on mean 
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saving such that the distribution is cut-off at the 99.5 percentile. 
Separately for each educational level, figure 21 shows age profiles 
constructed as in section 4.2.1 for net income, consumption, and 
saving along with adjusted saving and adjusted consumption 
(dashed lines). The latter is calculated as net income minus adjusted 
saving. 
Indeed, adjusting for the number of children turns the age profile of 
annual saving from a rather flat profile to a hump-shaped one. 
Though the hump shape in the consumption profile is not com-
pletely removed, it is reduced quite a bit for households above 30, 
especially at the high educational level. Essentially, adjusted con-
sumption appears to track income only up to age 30. This might be 
explained by liquidity constraints and precaution, but also by an-
other facet of household composition: Up to age 30, an increasing 
fraction of households starts sharing the household with a partner, 
which tends to increase both household income and consumption. 
But since the estimation results indicate that having a partner also 
increases saving, it is not easy to adjust consumption for having a 
partner, and it cannot be done with the estimation results of this 
study. 
Nevertheless, we can conclude that accounting for the number of 
children significantly reduces the hump shape in consumption, espe-
cially in high education households. Thus, it can be considered as an 
important factor in explaining the consumption/income parallel 
within the framework of the LCPIH, in particular after the first third 
of the life cycle, where liquidity constraints and precautionary sav-
ing loose explanatory power, as argued in section 2.1. 
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Figure 21: Life Cycle Profiles of Adjusted Consumption and Saving 
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Source:  SAVE 2005-2007, restricted sample with additional truncation, weighted, 
and averaged over the five imputed data sets. 
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7 Conclusion 
This study investigated education, income and age driven heteroge-
neity in the effect of children in and outside the household on annual 
saving, the importance of saving motives, and the regularity of sav-
ing, using the 2005-2007 waves of the German SAVE dataset. As an 
introduction, it was shown that a better understanding of the link 
between fertility and saving can both yield helpful implications for 
policy makers in the face of demographic transition and may con-
tribute to the reconciliation of theoretically predicted and empiri-
cally observed life cycle saving behavior. On the basis of theoretical 
considerations and former empirical evidence, hypotheses on the 
effect of children on the three dimensions of saving behavior were 
formulated. The results of the descriptive and regression based 
analysis were mostly in line with these hypotheses. Children were 
found to have a negative effect on the level and the regularity of 
saving, and they appear to intensify the competition among saving 
motives, shifting the relative importance towards children-
complements (home acquisition, debt reduction, education/support, 
bequest, and state subsidies) at the expense of children-substitutes 
(large purchases, travel, precaution, and old-age provision). When 
children leave the household, their influence gets usually weaker, 
but shows more persistence in high education households, at least 
with respect to the level and the regularity of saving. It was hy-
pothesized that this is a result of higher parental education inducing 
higher investment in the children’s human capital, which outweighs 
possible education induced effects of children on self control. Un-
fortunately, there is less evidence for educational differences in the 
effect of children on saving motives—in particular with respect to 
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the motives education/support and bequest—that would reinforce 
this hypostudy. However, this lack of educational differences in the 
observed pattern of motives to save might be attributable to the sub-
jective measurement of these variables, i.e., educational differences 
could be confounded by a tendency to give answers that are socially 
desired. Finally, higher household income and, to a lesser extent, 
higher parental age were found to alleviate the effect of children on 
saving behavior. 
Since the critical reader could be concerned that the estimated coef-
ficients might be biased by endogenous fertility behavior, the num-
ber of children was instrumented relying on exogenous variation in 
fertility created by peer group effects. The results do not indicate 
that the pattern outlined above is driven by endogenous fertility. 
This gives some reason to believe that the links between the number 
of children and household saving behavior are indeed causal. 
When the results were used to adjust consumption profiles, it was 
concluded that accounting for the number of children significantly 
reduces the hump shape in consumption and can thus contribute to 
explaining the consumption/income parallel, in particular after the 
first third of the life cycle. 
Of course, this analysis is not without weaknesses. Some of these 
weaknesses are a result of data limitations. Besides the deficiencies 
of the imputation procedure, a clear shortcoming of the data is the 
imprecise formulation of the question asking for annual saving that 
leaves the definition of saving to the respondent and makes the re-
sponses difficult to interpret (see section 3.2). To reduce the meas-
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urement error in this question, it should be restated to precisely ask 
for net annual saving. For instance, one could add the remark: 
“Please note that loan repayments are a part of your saving, while 
loan uptakes used to cover consumption expenditures reduce your 
saving.” Furthermore, respondents who indicate dissaving should be 
able to report a specific amount. This would remove the artificial 
left censoring of the data. 
Also, the observation period of three years is too short to distinguish 
properly between age and cohort effects. Both the construction of 
life cycle profiles in the descriptive analysis and the regression 
based analysis would significantly profit from a panel over a longer 
time period, which would allow for investigating life cycle variation 
in the effects of children more thoroughly. 
Besides settling these issues, further research on this topic could 
advance the analysis in mainly four directions.  
First, heterogeneity in effect of children should be considered with 
respect to further dimensions. Most important would be the chil-
dren’s age, which was only very imprecisely approximated by the 
children’s household affiliation. In particular, it would be interesting 
to see if the interaction effect of children in the household and the 
parent’s age on annual saving turns positive if the children’s age is 
controlled for. Besides pure age effects, information on the chil-
dren’s age would also allow to control for child spacing, i.e., the age 
gap between the children of a household (see, e.g., Freedman & 
Coombs (1966)). Other dimensions along which the children effect 
might vary are wealth, the marital status of the household head, the 
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duration of the marriage or partnership, the child’s gender and 
health, measures for risk aversion, and other character traits. A thor-
ough investigation of these interaction effects could answer ques-
tions like: Do the effects of children differ by the children’s gender? 
Do more risk averse parents save more per child? Do children in 
wealthier households affect saving motives differently than in less 
wealthy households? However, such a more detailed investigation 
would probably require larger sample sizes and less item non-
response. 
Second, more reliable instruments for the number of children could 
be constructed to address the endogeneity problem more thoroughly. 
For example, one could use an approach similar to the one in section 
6.4, but use a larger dataset like the Mikrozensus of the Statistisches 
Bundesamt to calculate cell means. This would yield larger cell 
sizes and the possibility to stratify by more criteria, e.g., the geo-
graphic region the household lives in. Another possible instrument 
would be something like the distance to the next day nursery, but 
this is hard to survey. 
Third, the analysis could be expanded by investigating the influence 
of children and various interactions on other dimensions of saving 
behavior, e.g., the composition of assets. In particular, it would be 
interesting to know whether the children induced shift in the relative 
importance of saving motives also affects the composition of assets. 
For instance, do children increase the fraction of housing and other 
real wealth? How does the number of children affect the fraction of 
risky assets? Do households with children provide less for their old-
age? Answers to these questions could reveal if households with 
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children are potentially undersupplied with certain assets, in particu-
lar old-age provision.  
Fourth, similar analyses could be conducted for other countries and 
their results compared to the ones established for Germany. Such 
international comparisons could answer questions like: Is there a 
similar pattern of effects of children on saving behavior across coun-
tries or are there important international differences? If the latter is 
the case, what does cause these differences? Especially, do house-
holds with small children save more in countries with higher tuition 
fees and other educational expenses? Further, is the educational 
difference in the effect of children more pronounced in these coun-
tries?   
Thus, there is a bunch of open questions that deserve attention. 
Their answers and some of the insights gained in this study may 
help to get a better understanding of the relationship between fertil-
ity and saving behavior, and how it is affected by household charac-
teristics. The results can serve as guidance for policy makers, who 
want to know about the ability of different household types to cope 
with the multiple task of raising children, making a living, and pro-
viding for unforeseen events and retirement. In the end, this knowl-
edge may help to design target-oriented tools that alleviate resulting 
tradeoffs specifically for those households for which these tradeoffs 
are most severe. Since the ability to explain heterogeneity in the 
effect of children is crucial in this context, and since the results of 
this study suggest that we are able to explain some of this heteroge-
neity and that better data and further research is likely to help ex-
plaining a good deal more, this topic is definitely worth to be pur-
sued further. 
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Appendix 
Table A.1:  Description of Variables 
Variable Description 
 
saving 
 
Annual household saving in €, left-censored at 0. 
mot_[…] Absolute importance of a saving motive on a scale from 0 (totally 
unimportant) to 10 (very important). 
mot_homeacquisition  = home acquisition motive 
mot_largepurchases   = large purchases motive 
mot_debtreduction  = debt reduction motive 
mot_precaution  = precautionary motive 
mot_oldageprov  = old-age provision motive 
mot_travel   = travel motive 
mot_education  = education/support motive 
mot_bequest  = bequest motive 
mot_statesubsidies  = state subsidies motive 
mot_[…]_rel Relative importance of a saving motive on a scale from 0 to 1. 
savereg Categorical variable for the regularity of saving: 
savereg = 1 [save_enjoy = 1]:  enjoy life non-saver 
savereg = 2 [save_no_money = 1]: no money non-saver 
savereg = 3 [save_irreg = 1]:  irregular saver 
savereg = 4 [save_reg_flex = 1]:  regular flexible saver 
savereg = 5 [save_reg_fix = 1]:  regular fix saver 
consumption Annual household consumption, defined as netinc*1000 – saving. 
children_in_h 
children_in_h_12 
children_in_h_3+ 
children_in_h_123 
children_in_h_4+ 
child_in_h 
Total number of children and children-in-law living inside the house-
hold. 
children_in_h_12  = children_in_h if children_in_h < 3; 0 otherwise 
children_in_h_3+  = children_in_h if children_in_h ≥ 3; 0 otherwise 
children_in_h_123  = children_in_h if children_in_h < 4; 0 otherwise 
children_in_h_4+  = children_in_h if children_in_h ≥ 4; 0 otherwise 
child_in_h  = 1 if children_in_h > 0. 
children_out_h 
children_out_h_12 
children_out_h_3+ 
children_out_h_123 
children_out_h_4+ 
child_out_h 
Total number of children and children-in-law living outside the 
household. 
children_out_h_12  = children_out_h if children_out_h < 3;  
 0 otherwise 
children_out_h_3+  = children_out_h if children_out_h ≥ 3;  
 0 otherwise 
children_out_h_123  = children_out_h if children_out_h < 4;  
 0 otherwise 
children_out_h_4+  = children_out_h if children_out_h ≥ 4;  
 0 otherwise 
child_out_h  = 1 if children_out_h > 0. 
Appendix 
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Variable Description 
FHR_Abitur Dummy: 1 if the household head has Fachhochschulreife or Abitur 
(high school leaving certificate or a comparable certificate for a 
university of applied sciences).  
age, age2 age is the age (in years) of the household head, age2 is squared age. 
female Dummy: 1 if the household head is female. 
east Dummy: 1 if the household head lives in Eastern Germany. 
foreign Dummy: 1 if the household head is not a German citizen. 
partner  Dummy: 1 if the household head lives together with a partner. 
good_state_of_health  Dummy: 1 if the household head describes his state of health as good 
or very good. 
netinc, netinc2 netinc is annual net household income in €1,000,  
netinc2 is squared netinc. 
low_inc_var, 
high_inc_var 
Dummies for subjective categorical variable “income variability over 
the last 5 years”:  
high_inc_var  = 1 if the variability was considered significant. 
low_inc_var = 1 if the variability was considered low. 
base group: no income variability. 
increased_inc_prob Subjective probability of a raise in the household head’s income one 
year ahead on a scale from 0 to 1 with 0.1 increments.  
highheritage_prob Subjective probability of receiving a heritage or gift that would sig-
nificantly improve the household’s financial situation on a scale from 
0 to 1 with 0.1 increments. 
except_earn_low,  
except_earn_high 
Dummies for exceptional one-time earnings above €500 (such as 
bequests, gifts, lottery prizes, life insurance payouts), except for tax 
refunds. 
except_earn_low = 1 if 0 < one-time earnings < 2 * monthly  
 net income.   
except_earn_high = 1 if one-time earnings ≥ 2 * monthly net  
 income. 
base group: no exceptional one-time earnings. 
pay_support Dummy: 1 if the household makes regular support payments exceed-
ing €25 per month to persons outside the household.  
repay_homeloan Dummy: 1 if the household currently pays off a home loan  
(Bausparvertrag). 
repay_mortgage Dummy: 1 if the household currently pays off a mortgage. 
job_contract_l Dummy: 1 if the household head has a temporary work contract. 
probjobloss Subjective probability of loosing the current place of employment in 
the year of the survey, on a scale from 0 to 1 with 0.1 increments. 
 iii 
Variable Description 
blue_collar, 
white_collar, 
civil_servant, 
self_employed, 
freelancer 
Dummies for categorical variable “employment status” of the house-
hold head: 
blue_collar = 1 if current type of employment is blue-collar  
 worker. 
white_collar = 1 if current type of employment is white-collar  
 worker. 
civil_servant = 1 if current type of employment is civil servant. 
self_employed = 1 if current type of employment is self-employed. 
freelancer = 1 if current type of employment is freelancer. 
base group: none of these (farmers, family members working in 
family business, currently not in paid employment). 
unemployed Dummy: 1 if the household head is currently unemployed. 
retired Dummy: 1 if the household head is retired. 
work_full, 
work_part, 
work_little 
Dummies for categorical variable “extent of employment” of the 
household head: 
work_full  = 1 if the household head has full-time employment.  
 (at least 35 hours per week) 
work_part  = 1 if the household head has part-time employment. 
 (at least 15 hours, but less than 35 hours per week) 
work_little  = 1 if the level of employment is low or even casual. 
 (less than 15 hours per week) 
base group: not in paid employment. 
insur_disability Dummy: 1 if the household head or his/her partner is insured against 
occupational disability. 
insur_liab Dummy: 1 if the household head or his/her partner has liability insur-
ance. 
wealth, wealth2  wealth is total net wealth of the household in €1,000 (i.e., savings 
investments, savings bonds, share- and real-estate bonds, occupational 
and private pension schemes, real estate, business wealth etc.).  
wealth2  is squared wealth. 
homeowner Dummy: 1 if the household owns a home. 
habit Dummy: 1 if the household head describes himself as a creature of 
habit (at least 6 on a scale from 0 (totally inapplicable) to 10 (totally 
applicable). 
optimism Dummy: 1 if the household head describes himself as rather optimis-
tic (at least 6 on a scale from 0 (totally inapplicable) to 10 (totally 
applicable). 
easy_going Dummy: 1 if the household head describes himself as living for the 
moment rather than planning the future (at most 4 on a scale from 0 
(living for the moment) to 10 (exactly planning the future). 
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Variable Description 
spontaneous Dummy: 1 if the household head describes himself as spontaneous 
rather than observant (at most 4 on a scale from 0 (spontaneous) to 10 
(observant). 
smoker Dummy: 1 if the household head is a smoker. 
live_shorter, 
live_longer 
Dummies for living shorter or longer than persons of the same age 
live_shorter  = 1 if the household head expects to live shorter.  
live_shorter  = 1 if the household head expects to live longer.  
base group: household head expects to live roughly as long as 
average. 
 v 
Table A.2:  Sample Characteristics by Year and Educational Level 
Characteristics SAVE 2005 - 2007 
  Low Education High Education 
     
Observations 5,726 2,121 
Fraction 72.98% 27.02% 
     
Sociodemographic     
     
Female 53.16% 44.06% 
East 30.43% 28.75% 
Foreign citizenship 2.28% 4.27% 
Partner 52.89% 55.89% 
Good state of health 48.52% 65.85% 
     
Age     
19 - 25 3.93% 8.40% 
26 - 35 9.59% 19.29% 
36 - 45 19.57% 20.67% 
46 - 55 19.60% 16.44% 
56 - 65 20.49% 15.73% 
over 65 26.82% 19.47% 
mean (std. dev.) 53.79(15.81) 48.11(16.81) 
     
No. of Children in Household     
0 71.58% 69.02% 
1 14.58% 14.97% 
2 10.19% 11.53% 
3 2.67% 3.59% 
4 0.70% 0.56% 
5+ 0.28% 0.33% 
mean (std. dev.) 0.47(0.88) 0.53(0.92) 
     
No. of Children outside Household   
0 41.82% 57.72% 
1 20.00% 15.52% 
2 21.06% 15.78% 
3 10.16% 6.67% 
4 3.77% 2.29% 
5+ 3.19% 2.02% 
mean (std. dev.) 1.27(1.48) 0.87(1.26) 
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Characteristics SAVE 2005 - 2007 
  Low Education High Education
     
Financial/Economic     
     
Monthly Net Income Quintiles and Median   
Min 0 0
20th percentile 994 1,050
40th percentile 1,400 1,900
Median 1,600 2,200
60th percentile 1,917 2,600
80th percentile 2,600 3,500
Max 40,000 26,000
mean (std. dev.) 1,866(1,386) 2,451(1,649)
     
Annual Saving Quintiles and Median   
Min 0 0
20th percentile 0 0
40th percentile 0 100
Median 200 1,000
60th percentile 1,000 2,000
80th percentile 2,800 4,972
Max 250,000 200,000
mean (std. dev.) 1,898(5,826) 3,068(7,880)
   
Total Wealth Quintiles and Median   
Min -203,505 -207,081
20th percentile 0 1,320
40th percentile 7,500 24,000
Median 24,791 57,190
60th percentile 66,000 112,522
80th percentile 203,000 291,781
Max 2,500,000 2,499,381
mean (std. dev) [in €1,000] 113.6(212.3) 163.7(262.6)
     
Past Income Variability     
Significant 27.41% 29.74%
Slight 44.95% 43.97%
None (base) 27.64% 26.30%
     
Exceptional Earnings     
High 10.16% 12.32%
Low 6.53% 11.34%
 vii 
Characteristics SAVE 2005 - 2007 
  Low Education High Education 
     
Employment Status     
Retired 39.54% 25.46% 
Blue-collar  16.31% 4.74% 
White-collar 20.95% 35.42% 
Civil servant 2.06% 8.04% 
Self-employed 2.97% 5.10% 
Freelancer 1.11% 5.20% 
Unemployed 11.69% 6.96% 
Education/Apprenticeship/ 
Parental leave/Military service (base) 
5.37% 9.08% 
     
Extent of Employment     
Full-time 28.29% 40.83% 
Part-time 9.60% 10.35% 
Casual 8.15% 11.02% 
None of these (base) 53.96% 37.80% 
     
Increased income probability 17.45% 32.56% 
High heritage probability 2.96% 5.10% 
Regular support payments 12.64% 19.72% 
Repayment home loan 7.58% 7.92% 
Repayment mortgage 12.84% 18.60% 
Temporary work contract 6.16% 9.56% 
Probability of loosing employment 11.46% 12.88% 
Disability insurance 19.59% 31.55% 
Liability insurance 79.06% 84.46% 
Homeownership 44.16% 46.95% 
     
Psychological     
     
Creature of habit 58.73% 54.94% 
Optimistic 65.67% 73.09% 
Easy going 15.49% 11.08% 
Spontaneous 26.59% 29.77% 
Smoker 32.00% 23.24% 
     
Life Expectancy     
Live shorter than average 17.72% 17.62% 
Live longer than average 15.34% 20.30% 
Live as long as average (base) 66.94% 62.08% 
All statistics are weighted and represent averages over the 5 imputed datasets. 
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Figure A.1:  Cohort Analysis of Annual Net Income, Consump-
tion, Saving, and Children, Stratified by Education 
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High Education Households 
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Source:  SAVE 2005-2007, restricted sample, weighted, and averaged over the five imputed 
data sets. 
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Figure A.2:  Age Profiles of Annual Net Income, Consumption, 
Saving, and Children, Stratified by Education 
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High Education Households 
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 Thick lines represent 10 year moving averages of means; thin lines mark a corridor with limits
equal to the mean +/- one standard error. 
Source:  SAVE 2005-2007, restricted sample, weighted, and averaged over the five imputed 
data sets. 
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Figure A.3: Absolute Importance of Saving Motives by Children 
in the Household., Age, and Education 
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High Education Households 
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Source:  SAVE 2005-2007, restricted sample, weighted, and averaged over the five  
imputed data sets. 
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Figure A.4: Abs. Importance of Saving Motives by Children 
outside the Household., Age, and Education 
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High Education Households 
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Source:  SAVE 2005-2007, restricted sample, weighted, and averaged over the five  
imputed data sets. 
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Figure A.5: Relative Importance of Saving Motives by Children, 
Age, and Education 
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Children outside the Household 
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Source:  SAVE 2005-2007, restricted sample, weighted, and averaged over the five imputed 
data sets. 
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Figure A.6:  Annual Saving by the Number of Children in the 
Household, Age, and Education 
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Source:  SAVE 2005-2007, restricted sample with additional truncation, weighted, and 
averaged over the five imputed data sets. 
 
Figure A.7:  Annual Saving by the Number of Children outside 
the Household, Age, and Education 
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Source:  SAVE 2005-2007, restricted sample with additional truncation, weighted, and 
averaged over the five imputed data sets. 
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Figure A.8: Regularity of Saving by Children in the Household, 
Age, and Education 
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Fr
ac
tio
n
< 26 26-35 36-45
Age Group
46-55 56-65
0 1 2 3 45+ 0 1 2 3 45+ 0 1 2 3 45+ 0 1 2 3 45+ 0 1 2 3 45+
Low Education Households
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Fr
ac
tio
n
< 26 26-35 36-45
Age Group
46-55 56-65
0 1 2 3 45+ 0 1 2 3 45+ 0 1 2 3 45+ 0 1 2 3 45+ 0 1 2 3 45+
High Education Households
 
Source:  SAVE 2005-2007, restricted sample, weighted, and averaged over the five imputed 
data sets. 
 
Figure A.9: Regularity of Saving by Children outside the House-
hold, Age, and Education 
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Source:  SAVE 2005-2007, restricted sample, weighted, and averaged over the five imputed 
data sets. 
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Table A.4: Regression Results for Saving Motives  
 (Ordered Probit and Tobit Estimates3) 
 
Home Acquisition Absolute Importance 
  (1)   (2) 
Variable coef.   (s.e.)   coef.   (s.e.) 
children_in_h 0.080 *** (0.022)     
children_in_h_12     0.091 *** (0.028) 
children_in_h_3+     0.077 *** (0.028) 
children_in_h*FHR_Abitur -0.040  (0.034)     
children_in_h_12*FHR_Abitur    -0.096 ** (0.046) 
children_in_h_3+*FHR_Abitur    -0.020  (0.042) 
children_out_h -0.001  (0.016)     
children_out_h_12     0.020  (0.031) 
children_out_h_3+     -0.007  (0.016) 
children_out_h*FHR_Abitur -0.045  (0.029)     
children_out_h_12*FHR_Abitur    -0.184 *** (0.050) 
children_out_h_3+*FHR_Abitur    -0.013  (0.031) 
FHR_Abitur 0.095 * (0.050)   0.173 *** (0.053) 
Home Acquisition Relative Importance 
  (3)   (4) 
Variable coef.   (s.e.)   coef.   (s.e.) 
children_in_h 0.005 ** (0.002)     
children_in_h_12     0.005 * (0.003) 
children_in_h_3+     0.006 ** (0.003) 
children_in_h*FHR_Abitur -0.003  (0.003)     
children_in_h_12*FHR_Abitur     -0.008 * (0.004) 
children_in_h_3+*FHR_Abitur     -0.001  (0.004) 
children_out_h -0.001  (0.002)     
children_out_h_12     0.001  (0.003) 
children_out_h_3+     -0.001  (0.002) 
children_out_h*FHR_Abitur -0.004  (0.003)     
children_out_h_12*FHR_Abitur     -0.018 *** (0.005) 
children_out_h_3+*FHR_Abitur     -0.001  (0.003) 
FHR_Abitur 0.013 ** (0.005)   0.021 *** (0.005) 
3 Columns (1) and (2) refer to an ordered probit estimation, columns (3) and (4) to a two-sided 
Tobit estimation. 
Reported standard errors are robust to serial correlation, and coefficients and standard errors 
are estimated using Rubin’s method. 
*,**, and *** refer to significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. 
 
Though not shown here, all regressions control for the same set of covariates as in table A.3, 
except for the regressions for the motives home acquisition and debt reduction, which do not 
include repay_homeloan and repay_mortgage since these variables are likely to be 
endogenous with respect to these two motives. 
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Large Purchases Absolute Importance 
  (1)   (2) 
Variable coef.   (s.e.)   coef.   (s.e.) 
children_in_h -0.051 *** (0.018)  -0.012  (0.021) 
children_in_h*FHR_Abitur -0.051 * (0.029)  -0.055 * (0.030) 
children_in_h*(netinc-26.7)     6.4E-04  (5.1E-04) 
children_in_h*(age-51)     5.8E-03 *** (1.5E-03) 
children_out_h -0.028 ** (0.014)  -0.044 *** (0.016) 
children_out_h_FHR_Abitur -0.009  (0.024)  -0.015  (0.026) 
children_out_h*(netinc-26.7)     9.1E-04  (6.1E-04) 
children_out_h*(age-51)     2.1E-03 ** (9.6E-04) 
FHR_Abitur 0.018   (0.046)   0.014   (0.046) 
Large Purchases Relative Importance 
  (3)   (4) 
Variable coef.   (s.e.)   coef.   (s.e.) 
children_in_h -0.008 *** (0.001)  -0.006 *** (0.001) 
children_in_h*FHR_Abitur -0.003  (0.002)  -0.003  (0.002) 
children_in_h*(netinc-26.7)     9.3E-05 *** (3.4E-05) 
children_in_h*(age-51)     3.0E-04 ** (1.2E-04) 
children_out_h -0.003 ** (0.001)  -0.004 *** (0.001) 
children_out_h_FHR_Abitur 0.000  (0.002)  0.000  (0.002) 
children_out_h*(netinc-26.7)     1.1E-04 ** (4.7E-05) 
children_out_h*(age-51)     1.5E-04 ** (7.5E-05) 
FHR_Abitur 0.003   (0.004)   0.004   (0.004) 
 
Debt Reduction Absolute Importance 
  (1)   (2) 
Variable coef.   (s.e.)   coef.   (s.e.) 
children_in_h 0.093 *** (0.020)  0.104 *** (0.023) 
children_in_h*FHR_Abitur 0.012  (0.034)  0.025  (0.034) 
children_in_h*(netinc-26.7)     -1.3E-03 ** (5.4E-04) 
children_in_h*(age-51)     1.8E-03  (1.7E-03) 
children_out_h 0.024  (0.015)  0.021  (0.017) 
children_out_h*FHR_Abitur 0.032  (0.029)  0.050 * (0.030) 
children_out_h*(netinc-26.7)     -1.4E-03 ** (6.6E-04) 
children_out_h*(age-51)     -1.7E-04  (1.0E-03) 
FHR_Abitur -0.141 *** (0.054)   -0.160 *** (0.055) 
Debt Reduction Relative Importance 
  (3)   (4) 
Variable coef.   (s.e.)   coef.   (s.e.) 
children_in_h 0.005 ** (0.002)  0.006 ** (0.002) 
children_in_h*FHR_Abitur 0.007 ** (0.003)  0.008 ** (0.003) 
children_in_h*(netinc-26.7)     -1.2E-04 * (6.5E-05) 
children_in_h*(age-51)     1.6E-04  (1.6E-04) 
children_out_h 0.002  (0.002)  0.002  (0.002) 
children_out_h*FHR_Abitur 0.007 ** (0.003)  0.009 *** (0.003) 
children_out_h*(netinc-26.7)     -1.5E-04 * (8.0E-05) 
children_out_h*(age-51)     -2.0E-05  (1.2E-04) 
FHR_Abitur -0.018 *** (0.006)   -0.020 *** (0.006) 
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Travel Absolute Importance 
  (1)   (2) 
Variable coef.   (s.e.)   coef.   (s.e.) 
children_in_h -0.125 *** (0.020)  -0.103 *** (0.024) 
children_in_h*FHR_Abitur -0.007  (0.034)  -0.025  (0.034) 
children_in_h*(netinc-26.7)     2.0E-03 *** (6.9E-04) 
children_in_h*(age-51)     3.2E-03 ** (1.6E-03) 
children_out_h -0.013  (0.016)  -0.018  (0.017) 
children_out_h*FHR_Abitur 0.003  (0.027)  -0.014  (0.027) 
children_out_h*(netinc-26.7)     1.8E-03 *** (6.7E-04) 
children_out_h*(age-51)     1.3E-03  (1.1E-03) 
FHR_Abitur 0.008   (0.050)   0.022   (0.051) 
Travel Relative Importance 
  (3)   (4) 
Variable coef.   (s.e.)   coef.   (s.e.) 
children_in_h -0.015 *** (0.002)  -0.014 *** (0.002) 
children_in_h*FHR_Abitur 0.000  (0.003)  -0.002  (0.003) 
children_in_h*(netinc-26.7)     2.2E-04 *** (5.0E-05) 
children_in_h*(age-51)     9.5E-05  (1.3E-04) 
children_out_h -0.002  (0.002)  -0.002  (0.002) 
children_out_h*FHR_Abitur 0.002  (0.002)  0.000  (0.002) 
children_out_h*(netinc-26.7)     1.9E-04 *** (5.5E-05) 
children_out_h*(age-51)     1.5E-04  (1.1E-04) 
FHR_Abitur 0.002   (0.004)   0.004   (0.004) 
 
Precaution Absolute Importance 
  (1)   (2) 
Variable coef.   (s.e.)   coef.   (s.e.) 
children_in_h 0.015  (0.020)  0.011  (0.023) 
children_in_h*FHR_Abitur -0.024  (0.032)  -0.026  (0.032) 
children_in_h*(netinc-26.7)     2.7E-04  (4.6E-04) 
children_in_h*(age-51)     -5.5E-04  (1.6E-03) 
children_out_h -0.014  (0.014)  -0.025  (0.016) 
children_out_h*FHR_Abitur -0.015  (0.025)  -0.022  (0.026) 
children_out_h*(netinc-
26.7)     5.7E-04  (5.6E-04) 
children_out_h*(age-51)     1.2E-03  (9.0E-04) 
FHR_Abitur -0.019   (0.048)   -0.015   (0.048) 
Precaution Relative Importance 
  (3)   (4) 
Variable coef.   (s.e.)   coef.   (s.e.) 
children_in_h -0.007 *** (0.002)  -0.009 *** (0.002) 
children_in_h*FHR_Abitur 0.002  (0.002)  0.002  (0.002) 
children_in_h*(netinc-26.7)     3.1E-05  (5.1E-05) 
children_in_h*(age-51)     -3.1E-04 ** (1.4E-04) 
children_out_h 0.001  (0.002)  0.001  (0.001) 
children_out_h*FHR_Abitur -0.006 *** (0.002)  -0.006 *** (0.002) 
children_out_h*(netinc-
26.7)     -2.6E-05  (6.2E-05) 
children_out_h*(age-51)     -4.6E-05  (1.1E-04) 
FHR_Abitur 0.005   (0.004)   0.006   (0.004) 
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Old-age Provision Absolute Importance 
  (1)   (2) 
Variable coef.   (s.e.)   coef.   (s.e.) 
children_in_h 0.001  (0.020)  0.017  (0.027) 
children_in_h*FHR_Abitur -0.030  (0.039)  -0.030  (0.039) 
children_in_h*(netinc-26.7)     7.4E-05  (4.7E-04) 
children_in_h*(age-51)     2.2E-03  (1.9E-03) 
children_out_h -0.037 *** (0.013)  -0.031 * (0.017) 
children_out_h*FHR_Abitur -0.009  (0.034)  -0.005  (0.034) 
children_out_h*(netinc-26.7)     -1.6E-04  (5.4E-04) 
children_out_h*(age-51)     -4.8E-04  (1.1E-03) 
FHR_Abitur 0.060   (0.051)   0.056   (0.051) 
Old-age Provision Relative Importance 
  (3)   (4) 
Variable coef.   (s.e.)   coef.   (s.e.) 
children_in_h -0.008 *** (0.001)  -0.008 *** (0.002) 
children_in_h*FHR_Abitur 0.001  (0.003)  0.001  (0.003) 
children_in_h*(netinc-26.7)     -3.4E-05  (4.7E-05) 
children_in_h*(age-51)     -3.7E-05  (1.3E-04) 
children_out_h -0.004 *** (0.002)  -0.003 * (0.002) 
children_out_h*FHR_Abitur 0.001  (0.002)  0.001  (0.002) 
children_out_h*(netinc-26.7)     -5.1E-05  (5.4E-05) 
children_out_h*(age-51)     -1.5E-04  (9.5E-05) 
FHR_Abitur 0.008 ** (0.004)   0.008 ** (0.004) 
 
Education/Support Absolute Importance 
  (1)   (2) 
Variable coef.   (s.e.)   coef.   (s.e.) 
child_in_h     0.732 *** (0.062) 
children_in_h 0.300 *** (0.022)  0.041  (0.028) 
child_in_h*FHR_Abitur     -0.009  (0.121) 
children_in_h*FHR_Abitur 0.019  (0.039)  0.013  (0.060) 
child_out_h     0.340 *** (0.060) 
children_out_h 0.040 *** (0.014)  -0.014  (0.018) 
child_out_h*FHR_Abitur     -0.125  (0.111) 
children_out_h*FHR_Abitur 0.032  (0.026)  0.061  (0.040) 
FHR_Abitur -0.058   (0.057)   0.001   (0.062) 
Education/Support Relative Importance 
  (3)   (4) 
Variable coef.   (s.e.)   coef.   (s.e.) 
child_in_h     0.058 *** (0.005) 
children_in_h 0.028 *** (0.002)  0.007 *** (0.002) 
child_in_h*FHR_Abitur     -0.003  (0.009) 
children_in_h*FHR_Abitur 1.0E-03  (3.1E-03)  1.5E-03  (4.6E-03) 
child_out_h     0.039 *** (0.005) 
children_out_h 7.0E-03 *** (1.4E-03)  2.2E-04  (1.7E-03) 
child_out_h*FHR_Abitur     -0.013  (0.009) 
children_out_h*FHR_Abitur 1.5E-03  (2.4E-03)  4.2E-03  (3.5E-03) 
FHR_Abitur 2.1E-03   (4.9E-03)   8.5E-03   (5.3E-03) 
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Bequest Absolute Importance 
  (1)   (2) 
Variable coef.   (s.e.)   coef.   (s.e.) 
child_in_h     0.361 *** (0.069) 
children_in_h 0.151 *** (0.022)  0.034  (0.035) 
child_in_h*FHR_Abitur     -0.040  (0.126) 
children_in_h*FHR_Abitur -0.013  (0.034)  -0.004  (0.059) 
child_out_h     0.368 *** (0.054) 
children_out_h 0.030 ** (0.015)  -0.036 ** (0.018) 
child_out_h*FHR_Abitur     -0.123  (0.112) 
children_out_h*FHR_Abitur 0.009  (0.025)  0.034  (0.044) 
FHR_Abitur -0.126 ** (0.054)   -0.068   (0.060) 
Bequest Relative Importance 
  (3)   (4) 
Variable coef.   (s.e.)   coef.   (s.e.) 
child_in_h     0.030 *** (0.006) 
children_in_h 0.014 *** (0.002)  0.004 ** (0.003) 
child_in_h*FHR_Abitur     -0.006  (0.011) 
children_in_h*FHR_Abitur -9.8E-04  (2.9E-03)  7.6E-04  (4.8E-03) 
child_out_h     0.036 *** (0.005) 
children_out_h 4.1E-03 *** (1.5E-03)  -2.4E-03  (1.9E-03) 
child_out_h*FHR_Abitur     -0.012  (0.010) 
children_out_h*FHR_Abitur 4.7E-04  (2.6E-03)  2.9E-03  (4.4E-03) 
FHR_Abitur -7.8E-03   (4.9E-03)   -1.8E-03   (5.3E-03) 
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State Subsidies Absolute Importance 
  (1)   (2) 
Variable coef.   (s.e.)   coef.   (s.e.) 
children_in_h 0.085 *** (0.021)     
children_in_h_123     0.121 *** (0.022) 
children_in_h_4+     0.017  (0.040) 
children_in_h*FHR_Abitur -0.069 ** (0.033)     
children_in_h_123*FHR_Abitur    -0.108 *** (0.037) 
children_in_h_4+*FHR_Abitur    0.014  (0.065) 
children_out_h 0.003  (0.017)     
children_out_h_123     0.036  (0.022) 
children_out__h_4+     -0.011  (0.020) 
children_out_h*FHR_Abitur -0.023  (0.030)     
children_out_h_123*FHR_Abitur    -0.081 *** (0.036) 
children_out_h_4+*FHR_Abitur    0.016  (0.043) 
FHR_Abitur -0.105 ** (0.052)   -0.051   (0.053) 
State Subsidies Relative Importance 
  (3)   (4) 
Variable coef.   (s.e.)   coef.   (s.e.) 
children_in_h 0.005 ** (0.002)     
children_in_h_123     0.006 *** (0.002) 
children_in_h_4+     0.004  (0.005) 
children_in_h*FHR_Abitur -0.005  (0.003)     
children_in_h_123*FHR_Abitur     -0.006 * (0.003) 
children_in_h_4+*FHR_Abitur     -0.003  (0.006) 
children_out_h -0.001  (0.002)     
children_out_h_123     0.001  (0.002) 
children_out__h_4+     -0.003  (0.002) 
children_out_h*FHR_Abitur -0.001  (0.003)     
children_out_h_123*FHR_Abitur     -0.006 * (0.003) 
children_out_h_4+*FHR_Abitur     0.002  (0.004) 
FHR_Abitur -0.007   (0.005)   -0.004   (0.005) 
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Table A.7: Instrumented Regression Results for Annual Sav-
ing (Instrumented Tobit Estimates) 
 
  (1)   (2) 
Variable coef.   (s.e.)   coef.   (s.e.)
children_in_h -1.062 * (0.547)   -0.476  (0.601) 
children_in_h*FHR_Abitur      -0.385  (0.472) 
children_out_h -0.286  (0.914)   0.533  (0.798) 
children_out_h*FHR_Abitur      -1.132 *** (0.306) 
FHR_Abitur -0.075  (0.235)   1.340 ** (0.581) 
          
age -0.104  (0.076)   -0.140 * (0.071) 
age2 1.1E-03 ** (5.0E-04)   1.3E-03 ** (5.0E-04) 
female -0.463 * (0.243)   -0.614 *** (0.238) 
east 0.315  (0.277)   0.264  (0.266) 
foreign -0.913  (0.575)   -0.909  (0.577) 
partner 0.728 * (0.424)   0.435  (0.392) 
good_state_of_health 0.851 *** (0.209)   0.977 *** (0.205) 
netinc 0.075 *** (0.009)   0.079 *** (0.009) 
netinc2 -1.6E-04 *** (3.5E-05)   -1.8E-04 *** (3.5E-05) 
low_income_var -0.077  (0.187)   -0.075  (0.186) 
high_income_var -1.076 *** (0.267)   -1.139 *** (0.250) 
increased_inc_prob 0.334  (0.292)   0.254  (0.288) 
highheritage_prob 0.760  (0.505)   0.714  (0.515) 
except_earn_low 1.193 *** (0.261)   1.250 *** (0.266) 
except_earn_high 1.661 *** (0.230)   1.679 *** (0.232) 
pay_support 0.149  (0.433)   0.078  (0.390) 
repay_homeloan -0.310  (0.314)   -0.418  (0.319) 
repay_mortgage -0.153  (0.256)   -0.216  (0.258) 
job_contract_l -0.366  (0.360)   -0.358  (0.359) 
probjobloss -0.547  (0.342)   -0.569  (0.348) 
blue_collar 0.887  (0.634)   0.930  (0.623) 
white_collar 1.121 * (0.620)   1.069 * (0.600) 
civil_servant 2.048 *** (0.694)   1.882 *** (0.684) 
self_employed 0.811  (0.711)   0.752  (0.710) 
freelancer 0.693  (0.807)   0.652  (0.809) 
unemployed -2.017 *** (0.391)   -1.848 *** (0.396) 
retired 0.997 ** (0.406)   1.145 *** (0.415) 
work_full 0.199  (0.565)   0.433  (0.569) 
work_part 0.233  (0.577)   0.390  (0.565) 
work_little 0.368  (0.536)   0.446  (0.528) 
insur_job 0.319  (0.215)   0.295  (0.215) 
insur_liab 1.939 *** (0.269)   1.968 *** (0.269) 
wealth 6.5E-03 *** (9.1E-04)   7.0E-03 *** (9.0E-04) 
wealth2 -3.5E-06 *** (5.6E-07)   -3.7E-06 *** (5.6E-07) 
homeowner 0.030  (0.246)   0.007  (0.246) 
habit 0.482 *** (0.159)   0.458 *** (0.160) 
optimism 0.374 ** (0.182)   0.359 * (0.185) 
easy_going -1.280 *** (0.269)   -1.269 *** (0.265) 
spontaneous -0.357 * (0.194)   -0.389 ** (0.190) 
smoker -0.349 * (0.211)   -0.373 * (0.214) 
live_shorter 0.583 *** (0.225)   0.577 ** (0.225) 
live_longer 0.231  (0.242)   0.143  (0.240) 
Y2005 0.467 *** (0.167)   0.476 *** (0.164) 
Y2007 -0.200  (0.139)   -0.175  (0.139) 
const -0.378   (1.655)   -0.509   (1.605) 
 xxxi 
Instrumented:   children_in_h children_in_h*FHR_Abitur children_out_h children_out_h*FHR_Abitur 
Instruments: FHR_Abitur age age2 female east foreign partner good_state_of_health netinc netinc2 
low_income_var high_income_var increased_inc_prob highheritage_prob except_earn_low ex-
cept_earn_high pay_support repay_homeloan repay_mortgage job_contract_l probjobloss 
blue_collar white_collar civil_servant self_employed freelancer unemployed retired work_full 
work_part work_little insur_job insur_liab wealth wealth2 homeowner habit optimism 
easy_going spontaneous smoker live_shorter live_longer Y2005 Y2007 cih_cell 
cih_cell*FHR_Abitur coh_cell coh_cell*FHR_Abitur 
Reported standard errors are robust to serial correlation, and coefficients and standard errors are 
estimated using Rubin’s method. 
*,**, and *** refer to significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. 
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